Java and Microsoft: How Does the Antitrust Story Unfold by Gifford, Daniel J.
Volume 44 Issue 1 Article 2 
1999 
Java and Microsoft: How Does the Antitrust Story Unfold 
Daniel J. Gifford 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel J. Gifford, Java and Microsoft: How Does the Antitrust Story Unfold, 44 Vill. L. Rev. 67 (1999). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1999]
JAVA AND MICROSOFT:
HOW DOES THE ANTITRUST STORY UNFOLD?
DANIEL J. GIWFORD*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 67
II. THE VISION OF THE JAVA PLATFORM ........................ 72
A. The Government and Microsoft .......................... 72
B. The Java Platform Paradigm: A Vision of the Future? . . . . . .  74
C. The Technology ........................................ 81
1. Operating Systems .................................. 81
2. The Internet and the World Wide Web ................ 84
3. Browsers .......................................... 85
4. Java .............................................. 87
5. Java Rivals ....................................... 89
III. PATH DEPENDENCY, NETWORK EFFECTS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE .................... 90
A. The Economics ......................................... 90
B. Historical Events Contributing to Microsoft's Dominance Over
Operating Systems ...................................... 93
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY- THE GOVERNMENT
CASE AND THE JAVA PLATFORM PARADIGM ................... 96
A. Tying the Browser to the Operating System ................. 97
B. Innovation and Incompatible Systems ..................... 110
V. How INNOVATION AND INCOMPATIBILITY RELATE TO THE JAVA
PLATFORM PARADIGM ...................................... 111
A. Two Kinds of Incompatibility ............................ 112
1. Innovation and the Process of Standardization in a
Context of No-Holds Barred Competition ............... 112
2. Innovation Implicating the Java Platform Paradigm .... 116
B. Antitrust, Innovation and the Java Platform Paradigm ..... 122
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................. 123
I. INTRODUCTION
APID developments in the software industry underlie both the Gov-
X rnment's antitrust proceedings against the Microsoft Corporation'
and the lawsuit brought by Sun Microsystems, Inc. ("Sun") against
* Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
The author acknowledges helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article from
Jim Chen, Paul Edelman, Daniel A. Farber, Peter Klausler, David McGowan, John
Risken, James J. Risser, Thomas Smith and E. Thomas Sullivan.
1. See generally Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1998-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 72,261 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998) (filed May 18, 1998) (No. 98-1232) [here-
(67)
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Microsoft in which Sun is asserting claims grounded in breach of contract,
trademark infringement and unfair competition. 2 In October 1997, the
Government challenged the Microsoft Corporation's right to bundle its
internet browser (the Microsoft Internet Explorer 4.0) with its Windows 95
operating system.3 That proceeding was brought as a request for an order
to show cause why Microsoft should not be held in contempt for violating
a consent decree ending a suit brought by the Government in 1995, the
primary focus of which was on Microsoft's licensing practices. In May
1998, the Government instituted a new action against Microsoft. This new
action again challenged Microsoft's bundling of its browser with its operat-
ing system, including its new Windows 98 operating system. 4 In the new
action, the Government also challenged the tie as monopolization and at-
tempted monopolization. 5 In addition, the Government added other
claims, including an alleged attempt to divide the browser market with
Netscape 6 and several agreements with internet services providers and in-
ternet content providers,7 matters which are not discussed in this Article.
Although Microsoft sees the browser as "integrated" into its operating sys-
tem so as to form one product, the Government sees the browser and the
operating system as two products "tied" together. Because the computer
codes underlying the browser and operating system overlap even more in
the Windows 98 context than in Windows 95,8 the Government's burden
in the new antitrust case on that issue will probably be heavier than it bore
in the contempt proceeding.
The Government wants Microsoft to disentangle the browser from its
Windows 98 and Windows 95 operating systems. Indeed, not far removed
from both the contempt proceeding and the new antitrust suit are issues
connected with Microsoft's modifications of Java, Sun Microsystem's re-
cently developed programming language and virtual machine architec-
inafter Complaint]; Contempt Petition, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1997 WL
656528 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 1997) (No. 94-1564) [hereinafter Contempt Petition].
2. SeeJohn Markoff, Sun Sues Microsoft on Use ofJava System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
1997, at D4 [hereinafter Markoff, Sun Sues Microsoft] (describing lawsuit between
Sun Microsystems and Microsoft over Java programming language); see also
Amended Complaint at 17-20, Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 999 F.
Supp. 1301 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (No. 97-20884) [hereinafter Amended Complaint],
available in <http://java.sun.com/lawsuit/complaint.html> (alleging breach of
contract, trademark infringement and unfair competition).
3. See generally Contempt Petition, supra note 1 (alleging that Microsoft had
violated terms of consent decree by bundling its browser with its operating system).
The consent decree had been entered in August 1995. See United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,096 (D.D.C. 1995).
4. See Complaint, supra note 1, 103-23, 134-37 (alleging tying of Microsoft's
browser software to its operating system).
5. See id. 138-41.
6. See id. 70-71.
7. See id. 1 75-92.
8. In Windows 98, the browser is fully integrated into the operating system.
See, e.g., John Montgomery, The Next Windows, BwrE, Jan. 1998, at 56.
[Vol. 44: p. 67
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ture.9 Sun is litigating Microsoft's right under its license from Sun to
introduce its own modifications of Java programming. Underlying both
the Sun/Microsoft lawsuit and the Government's continuing antitrust
challenges are competing visions of the future of personal computing and
the internet. In hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the
Chief Operating Officers of Sun and Netscape complained that Microsoft
was abusing its dominance in the personal computer operating systems
market.10 Sun and Netscape have a different vision of the future than
does Microsoft.
These disputes involve, in one way or another, a vision of the world of
business and personal computing that is significantly different from the
present. This vision is that of the Java platform paradigm-one in which
browsers employing Java programming and connected via the internet to
servers manipulate software applications programs residing on servers
rather than on the hard disk of the computer user. This vision is a power-
ful one. Its realization would carry enormous economic consequences, in-
cluding, inter alia, the undermining of Microsoft's dominance over
personal computer operating systems. It is a vision that the Government
has invoked directly in its new antitrust lawsuit."1
This Article explores the connections between this vision and the is-
sues of antitrust tying and monopolization surrounding Microsoft's rela-
tions to Java and the browser wars. It describes the relevant technology
and its consequences-how the software industry has largely settled
around a dominant operating system, the Windows platform,1 2 and how
9. See David Bank & John R. Wilkie, Microsoft Probe by U.S. Is Expanded to Cover
Issues Related to Sun's Java, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1998, at B6.
10. See generally Market Power and Structural Change in the Software Industry: Hear-
ing Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciay, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998), available in
1998 WL 8992527 (testimony of Scott McNealy, President and CEO, Sun Microsys-
tems, Inc., ("Sun") and testimony of Jim Barksdale, President and CEO, Netscape
Communications, Inc. ("Netscape")) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]. Netscape had
previously complained to the Justice Department of Microsoft bundling and other
behavior allegedly violative of the antitrust laws. See Netscape Letter to Justice Depart-
ment Accuses Microsoft of Antitrust Violations, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Daily (BNA)
(Aug. 23, 1996).
11. See Complaint, supra note 1, 1[ 8, 68, 73, 107, 122 (containing allegations
based on Java platform paradigm).
12. See Memorandum of the United States in Support of Petition for an Order
to Show Cause Why Respondent Microsoft Corporation Should Not Be Found in
Civil Contempt at 5 n.1, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,990 (D.D.C. 1997) (No. 94-1564) [hereinafter Memorandum] (explaining
that in computer industry jargon, operating systems, in combination with underly-
ing hardware, have come to be referred to as "platforms"). Operating systems
serve as a "platform" (containing the applications programming interfaces or
"APIs") on top of which the applications run and for which they are written. See id.
at 2; see also WILLIAM S. DAvis, OPERATING SYSTEMS: A SYSTEMMIC VIEW 3 (4th ed.
1992). Application software (such as word-processing programs, spreadsheet pro-
grams, data management programs, etc.) thus is written for a particular plat-
form-a Windows platform, a Macintosh platform, a UNIX platform, etc.
Although Java is not an operating system, it nonetheless controls how a developer
19991
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that dominance may be threatened by the advent of Java programming
and the Java platform. This Article also discusses some of the problematic
aspects of the vision. It also addresses the relation of the concepts of net-
work externalities and path dependency to the emergence of the Java-
based challenge to the Windows platform. This discussion identifies fac-
tors that promise to advance or retard the potential replacement of the
Windows platform by a Java substitute and factors that may only appear to
do so.
Although the Java platform paradigm plays a role in Sun's lawsuit, the
Government's proceedings squarely bring the Java paradigm into the anti-
trust context.13 Both of the Government's antitrust proceedings raise is-
sues that are important and not well understood by many antitrust
practitioners. Although the contempt proceeding has been fought largely
under the rubric of antitrust "tying" doctrine14 and the new antitrust case
asserts claims under monopolization, attempted monopolization and ty-
ing, the issues of concern have to do with the way antitrust law interacts
with a highly dynamic modern industry in the throes of change. In the
past, a number of commentators have suggested that where network exter-
nalities and path dependency analysis become relevant, an aggressive ap-
plication of antitrust becomes warranted.' 5 Although these theories
explain much of Microsoft's dominance in operating systems, their appli-
cation to the browser wars needs more analysis than has appeared in the
literature to this point. The Government may view its lawsuits as preemp-
tive strikes designed to prevent or to impede Microsoft from using net-
work effects to advance down a path towards browser dominance.1 6 The
vision of the Java platform paradigm plays a supporting role in the Govern-
ment's cases. Sun's lawsuit, while raising legally mundane issues of con-
writes applications software analogous to the way an operating system controls how
that software is written. See generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java
Change Everything? The Competitive Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, 43 ANTITRUST
BULL. 715, 749 (1998) [hereinafter Lemley & McGowan, Competitive Propriety] (ex-
plaining howJava might transform browser into platform-independent meta-oper-
ating system). Some observers refer to a Java platform as analogous to the
Windows platform. See id. This Article adopts that usage.
13. For a discussion of the Java platform paradigm in the context of the Gov-
ernment's new antitrust lawsuit, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
14. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (holding browser integrated into operating system).
15. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Baseman et al., Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of
Exclusionary Pricing and Technical Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in Mar-
ketsfor Operating System Software, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 265, 298-315 (1995) (arguing
that presence of network externalities and path dependency requires more strin-
gent antitrust enforcement).
16. See Lemley & McGowan, Competitive Propriety, supra note 12, at 718-21, 726-
27, 734-35 (relating network effect analysis to Government's current intervention).
Microsoft's tie of its browser to its operating system produces anticompetitive con-
sequences over time through network effects.
[Vol. 44: p. 67
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tract interpretation, trademark law and unfair competition, also invokes
the Java platform paradigm for support.17
In attempting to untangle the various disputes and the ways that they
relate to the Java platform paradigm, this Article deals with a number of
related issues. Part II describes the vision of the Java platform paradigm as
a potential successor to the Windows platform paradigm.1 8 Part II also
briefly describes some of the technology forming the background to the
scenario in which Java replaces Windows as the dominant platform. 19 Part
III reviews the concepts of network externalities and path dependency. 20
Part III also considers how these concepts relate to Microsoft's present
dominance in personal computer operating systems.2 1 Part IV deals di-
rectly with the Government's assertion that Microsoft is unlawfully tying its
browser to its operating system and thereby violating section one or two of
the Sherman Act.22 Also in Part IV, this Article concludes that while the
Government's contention is certainly doctrinally plausible, it is nonethe-
less a highly technical one with a number of problematic aspects. 23 The
Government's real rationale in pursuing its tying and related monopoliza-
tion claims lies in its apparent belief that this tie is aiding Microsoft to
protect its Windows platform monopoly against technological changes
that threaten to undermine it.2 4 Part V addresses the way innovation has
been affected by, or is related to, the browser wars, the Sun/Microsoft
dispute and the Government's antitrust actions. 25 Part V also explores
some of the industry developments most relevant to the Government's the-
17. See Plaintiffs' Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint 48-54,
Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 1998)(filed May 12, 1998) (No. 97-20884) [hereinafter Second Amended Complaint]
(alleging that Java platform paradigm threatens Microsoft's dominance in operat-
ing systems).
18. For a discussion of the vision of the Java platform paradigm as a successor
to the Windows platform paradigm, see infra notes 43-83 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the technology forming the background to the scena-
rio in which Java replaces Windows as the dominant platform, see infra notes 84-
150 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the concepts of network externalities and path depen-
dency, see infra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the concepts of network externalities and path depen-
dency and their relation to Microsoft's present dominance in the operating system
market, see infra notes 166-85 and accompanying text.
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994). For a discussion of the Government's assertion
that Microsoft is unlawfully tying its browser to its operating system, see infra notes
189-265 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of conclusions regarding the Government's contention
regarding Microsoft, see infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of technological innovations and incompatible systems,
see infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the effects that the browser wars, the Sun/Microsoft
dispute and the Government's antitrust action have had upon innovation in the
software industry, see infra notes 270-323 and accompanying text.
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ory.26 Finally, this Article concludes that the potential for the erosion of
the Microsoft monopoly is dependent upon technological developments;
that the belief by the Government, Sun and some commentators that the
advent of the Java programming language is likely to accomplish that re-
sult is problematic; and that the future of the Windows platform is likely to
be determined by the market, regardless of (or in spite of) government
antitrust initiatives. 27 The concept of network externalities, far from work-
ing in favor of Microsoft technology as it did with operating systems, is
working against Microsoft Windows-only internet technologies. This Arti-
cle argues that if Microsoft technologies (such as J/Direct and ActiveX)
ultimately win in the market, they will prevail not because of network ef-
fects, but in spite of them. For these technologies to prevail, they must be
sufficiently superior to overcome the network value represented byJava. 28
II. THE VISION OF THE JAVA PLATFORM
A. The Government and Microsoft
The contempt proceeding grew out of Microsoft's efforts to bundle its
browser with its operating system. The later antitrust suit also challenges
this bundling. 29 Microsoft has been insisting that computer manufactur-
ers who purchase licenses to equip their products with the Windows 95
operating system also include its browser, the Internet Explorer, on those
machines. Microsoft's Windows 98 operating system increases the integra-
tion of the browser into the operating system.30
The current challenges are the latest in a series that the Government
has made-or has considered making-to Microsoft.3 1 As explained later,
the Government, in most or all of these actions, has been heavily influ-
enced by the theory of network externalities. 32 In 1995, the Government
thwarted Microsoft's attempt to acquire the Intuit Corporation and its fi-
nancial planning software, Quicken. As a result of the Government's chal-
lenge, the parties decided to call off their merger. 33 Later that year, the
26. For a discussion of some of the industry developments most relevant to
the Government's theory, see infra notes 290-321 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of this Article's conclusions, see infra notes 270-323 and
accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the relation of the concept of network externalities to
the Java platform paradigm, see infra notes 151-85, 322-23 and accompanying text.
29. See Complaint, supra note 1, 103-23, 134-37 (alleging tying of
Microsoft's software to its operating system).
30. See Montgomery, supra note 8, at 57.
31. See Complaint, supra note 1, 1 42-52 (listing chronology of United
States's antitrust challenges related to current lawsuit); see also A History of the
Microsoft Case, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, May 19, 1998, at D8, available in 1998
WL 3611045 (same).
32. For a discussion of the influence of the theory of network externalities on
the Government's actions, see infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
33. See Daniel J. Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, the Justice Department, and Anti-
trust Theory, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 621, 657-65 (1996) [hereinafter Gifford, Microsoft
[Vol. 44: p. 67
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Government considered challenging Microsoft's inclusion, on its Windows
95 operating system, of an icon enabling computer buyers to subscribe to
the Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft's then new proprietary network with
internet access.3 4 In 1994, the Government challenged Microsoft's licens-
ing practices, practices that were equivalent to exclusive supply con-
tracts.3 5 In their context, the lawfulness of those licensing practices was
unclear. 36 That action ended in a consent decree. 37 That consent decree
was the basis for the Government's first challenge to the browser/operat-
ing system bundle. The bundle has since been further challenged in an
entirely new antitrust suit.
The new antitrust suit alleges that Microsoft is violating the antitrust
laws by unlawfully tying its browser to the two operating systems (Windows
95 and Windows 98).38 It does so both in the language of tying doctrine
and in the language of monopolization and attempted monopolization. 39
In its earlier challenge under the consent decree, the Government con-
tended that Microsoft was violating the consent decree by tying its browser
to its operating system. 40 In the consent proceeding, the district court
ruled that the consent decree was sufficiently ambiguous as to preclude its
punishing Microsoft for its past behavior, but temporarily enjoined
Microsoft from requiring manufacturing licensees to include the browser
on new computers. 4 1 That determination, however, was reversed on ap-
peal when the appellate court took the view that on the record before the
Corporation] (detailing Microsoft's planned acquisition of Intuit, Inc.); Microsoft and
Intuit Abandon Merger Challenged by Division, 68 ANTITRUST,& TRADE REG. REP. 672,
672 (1995) (reporting on Microsoft's called-off $2 billion acquisition of Intuit,
Inc.).
34. See Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, supra note 33, at 665-69 (discussing anti-
trust issues related to location of Microsoft Exchange icon on Windows 95).
35. See id. (describing 1994 antitrust action and subsequent consent decree);
see also John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network
Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision Making, 40
ANTITRUST BuLL. 317, 326-28 (1995) [hereinafter Lopatka & Page, Antitrust Decision
Making] (notingJustice Department's characterization of licensing practices as "re-
quirements contracts").
36. See Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, supra note 33, at 631-44 (discussing law-
fulness of subject licencing practices).
37. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,096
(D.D.C. 1995) (issuing consent decree).
38. See Complaint, supra note 1, 11 103-23, 134-37 (alleging that Microsoft
unlawfully tied its internet browser to its Windows 95 and Windows 98 operating
systems).
39. See id. The tie of the browser to the operating system is challenged as a
violation of section one of the Sherman Act. See id. 17 134-37. It is also challenged
as monopolization and attempted monopolization. See id. 77 138-41.
40. See Memorandum, supra note 12, at 15 (charging that Microsoft violated
consent decree by tying internet browser to its operating systems).
41. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537, 541 (D.D.C. 1997)
(concluding, inter alia, that Microsoft demonstrated sufficiently ambiguity of term
"integrated product" under consent decree, but construing consent decree and
enjoining tie), rev'd, 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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court there was no tie because the browser and the operating system were
one product.
42
B. The Java Platform Paradigm: A Vision of the Future?
The theory underlying the Government's current initiative is a com-
plex one. The Government believes that the Java programming language
is threatening to undermine Microsoft's present dominance over operat-
ing systems and that Microsoft is trying to forestall that threat by attempt-
ing to control internet technology. 43 The Government believes that a
major step in Microsoft's attempt to control internet technology is to seek
dominance in browsers. The Government further believes that Microsoft
is using its dominance of personal computer operating systems as a lever
to achieve browser dominance. 4
4
Microsoft now holds a practical monopoly over personal computer
operating systems. Over eighty percent of personal computers run on
some version of Microsoft's Windows. 45 Older personal computers gener-
ally run on Microsoft's MS-DOS operating system with a Windows 3.1 over-
lay.4 6 Almost all new machines equipped with an Intel microprocessor (or
a simulation) and designed for the consumer market are equipped at the
factory with the Windows 98 operating system. 47 Many business machines
run on Windows for Workgroups and Windows NT.48 Because Microsoft's
Windows systems dominate the market, application software developers
possess strong economic incentives to write primarily for Windows sys-
tems.49 As a result, more applications programs exist for Windows plat-
forms than for alternative platforms like Macintosh, OS/2, Linux, UNIX
42. See Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d at 948-52 (concluding that Windows 95 and
Microsoft's internet browser do not exist separately and are functionally single
product).
43. See Complaint, supra note 1, 11 8, 37, 68, 73, 107, 122 (alleging that
Microsoft is threatened by Java and that Microsoft is attempting to control internet
technology).
44. See id. 13 ("Microsoft's conduct with respect to browsers is a prominent
and immediate example of the pattern of anticompetitive practices undertaken by
Microsoft with the purpose and effect of maintaining its [personal computer (PC)]
operating system monopoly and extending that monopoly to other related
markets.").
45. See id. 11 2, 57 (alleging that Windows operating systems are used on over
80% of Intel-based PCs).
46. See Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, supra note 33, at 625 (noting that original
Windows was overlay on underlying MS-DOS operating system).
47. See Complaint, supra note 1, 2 ("More than 90% of new Intel-based PCs
are shipped with a version of Windows pre-installed. PC manufacturers... have
no commercially reasonable alternative to Microsoft operating systems for the PCs
that they distribute.").
48. See Elizabeth Corcoran, Microsoft Says New Product to Be Major; Windows NT
5.0 Will Be Core of Its Systems, WASH. PosT, July 24, 1998, at F3 (noting that Windows
NT has many business users).
49. See Tom R. Halfhill, TODAY the WEB, TOMORROW the WORLD, ByrE, Jan.
1997, at 68, 70 [hereinafter Halfhill, TODAY the WEB] (stating that many commer-
[Vol. 44: p. 67
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss1/2
JAVA AND MICROSOFr
and others.50 This surfeit of applications software for Windows helps to
reinforce Microsoft's dominance in operating systems.
The development by Sun Microsystems of the Java programming lan-
guage threatens Microsoft's present hegemony. Java possesses a number
of remarkable capabilities, one of which is interoperability. 51 A program
written in Java is capable of running on any platform possessing a Java
interpreter or a Java virtual machine (i.e., software that converts the pro-
gram from Java code into the machine code specific to the user's plat-
form). This capability allows a program written in Java to run on
numerous platforms. 52 The same software thus can be marketed to the
Windows, Macintosh, OS/2, Linux and UNIX segments of the personal
computer market.53
At the present time, the focus of Java's ramifications is with the in-
ternet. Programs written in Java and placed on server websites can be re-
ceived by users regardless of the operating system running the user's
machine. 54 Currently, many websites contain small applications programs
written in Java (Java applets) that can interact with a viewer or otherwise
provide the viewer with screen-based action, such as animations, or minor
services, such as the computation of mortgage payments or the analysis of
other financial data based upon the user's input.5 5 Java carries the prom-
ise, however, of accomplishing vastly more than visual or other incidental
enhancement of websites because, as a programming language, Java can
provide the code for sophisticated applications programs. 5 6 Java's inter-
cial developers write their software for Windows first because Windows runs on
about 90% of world's PCs).
50. See id. (noting that Macintosh, OS/2 and UNIX are minority platforms,
while Microsoft continues to dominate).
51. See Richard V. Dragan & Larry Seltzer, Java: A Field Guide for Users, PC
MAG., May 27, 1997, at 100, 100. New operation system developers face a signifi-
cant obstacle in trying to break into the market because most software developers
write first for Microsoft's Windows. See Halfhill, TODAY the WEB, supra note 49, at
71 (noting that commercial developers write software for Windows first).
52. See Halfhill, TODAY the WEB, supra note 49, at 72 (noting that "Cross-plat-
form" compatibility is large factor in Java's early success). Some software compa-
nies have already begun to write Java development tools so that their programs will
run on any operating machine. See id.
53. See id. (discussing "write-once, run anywhere" character of programs writ-
ten in Java).
54. See id. (noting that Java programs can run independent of operating sys-
tem being used). One computer software developer has stated thatJava represents
the first language in which "developers can write applications using their Windows
people, their UNIX people, and their Mac[intosh] people." Id.
55. See Dragan & Seltzer, supra note 51, at 101 (noting that most common use
of Java is creation of interactive web page animated images).
56. See Halfhill, TODAY the WEB, supra note 49, at 70 (discussing new charac-
teristics ofJava that "help overcome [its] reputation as a lightweight language"). A
forerunner of a new breed of sophisticated applications programs is Lotus
JavaBean-based eSuite. See Steve Gillmor, A Different Desktop for the Workplace, BYrE,
Feb. 1998, at 41, 41; David Strom, Java-based App Shows Promise But Needs Work, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Feb. 9, 1998, at 53, 53.
1999]
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operability feature allows programs to be available to users from internet
servers, regardless of the differing platforms employed by those users.
57
Users will access the software by tying into the server. Rather than being
limited to the software installed on their hard disks, users will have access
to an infinite variety of applications programs located on servers. 58
Currently, most marketed versions of internet browsers are able to
handle Java programs. 59 These browsers incorporate Java virtual ma-
chines that translate programs in Java code into the machine code appro-
priate for the particular platform being employed by the browser user.60
As the installed base of Java virtual machines grows, the incentives for in-
ternet servers to employ Java programming will increase.
At the moment, Java provides internet servers the ability to enhance
their websites with visually dynamic decorative effects and the capability to
interact with users at the level of simple computations. In the next stage
of internet development, servers will carry sophisticated applications pro-
grams available for users through their browsers. Internet servers will re-
place users' individual hard disks as the source of applications programs. 61
There is a substantial likelihood that these server-based application pro-
grams will be written in Java because Java's interoperability feature makes
the development of Java programming more cost-effective than the alter-
natives. 6 2 Programming can be written once in Java and it will be available
for users on all platforms.
These developments will provide the context for the elimination of
Microsoft's dominance over personal computer operating systems. 63
57. See id. (discussing Java's cross-platform capabilities).
58. See Edward Mendelson, The Java Office, PC MAO., May 27, 1997, at 103
(noting that Java programs can be downloaded from servers whenever they are
needed).
59. See Dragan & Seltzer, supra note 51, at 101 (stating that HotJava, Microsoft
Internet Explorer, Netscape Communicator and Netscape Navigator have ability to
handle Java programs).
60. See id. (stating that "Java byte codes can be executed on any system that
has a Java virtual machine"). There appears to be grounds for believing that the
Microsoft Explorer handles Java programs faster and more reliably than the rival
Netscape Communicator 4.01. See Tom R. Halfhill & Al Gallant, How to Soup Up
Java, BrE, May 1998, at 60, 70 (comparing Microsoft Explorer's and Netscape
Communicator 4.01's handling of Java programs); see also David Seltzer, Editor's
Choice: MicrosoflJVM for Windows; MicrosoflJVM for Windows is Named the Top Java
Environment, PC MAC., Apr. 7, 1998, at 79, 79 (commenting on speed of Microsoft
JVM).
61. See Mendelson, supra note 58, at 103 (stating that Java programs will be
downloaded from internet or server).
62. The cost of writing several versions of a program is saved when a program
can be written once in Java and is usable by all platforms. Having to write different
programs for different operating systems is "extremely time-consuming and expen-
sive." Amended Complaint, supra note 2, 12.
63. See Halfhill, TODAY the WEB, supra note 49, at 70 (noting that Windows
may become minority platform). The Government's memorandum to the district
court in the consent proceeding embraced this vision:
[Vol. 44: p. 67
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When internet servers become the primary source for applications pro-
grams, the browser (rather than the Windows) interface will become the
primary reference point for both software developers and computer
users. 64 The ubiquitous Windows platform will be replaced by a Java-capa-
ble browser platform. 65 At that point, operating systems-while still
needed-would become mere tools of the browser. 66 They would become
interchangeable and Microsoft's power that it derives from Windows
would wither away. 67 This vision is shared by the Government, Sun
Microsystems, Netscape and others, and has received wide attention in
business publications. 68 The attractiveness of this vision has also been rec-
ognized in the antitrust literature. 69 Netscape's new browser software,
The threat that competing browsers present to Microsoft's monopoly has
two primary aspects: first, the degree to which browsers may become ac-
cepted as an interface, and second, the extent to which they can serve as a
platform to which applications can be written that are independent of the
underlying operating system.
Memorandum, supra note 12, at 34. The Government's reference to browsers serv-
ing as platforms for interoperable applications describes the vision articulated in
the text. In its lawsuit against Microsoft, Sun includes references to this vision. See
Amended Complaint, supra note 2, 51 & 52 (contending thatJava's cross-plat-
form capability poses serious threat to Microsoft's monopoly in operating systems
market).
64. See Memorandum, supra note 12, at 32 (noting that as computer users
increase their use of internet browsers as interfaces, they become less dependent
on operating systems).
65. See Halfhill, TODAY the WEB, supra note 49, at 70 (stating that Java could
"trigger the biggest platform switch since Windows surpassed DOS"). Apple,
Microsoft, IBM and others recognize that Java's potential abilities will provide a
.competitive advantage." See id. at 71 (discussing realization by several corpora-
tions that Java's potential and "superior run-time environment" will give them
competitive advantages). According to the Government, Java "threatens to reduce
or eliminate one of the key barriers to entry protecting Microsoft's operating sys-
tem monopoly." Complaint, supra note 1, 7.
66. See Halfhill, TODAY the WEB, supra note 49, at 74 (noting that Java will
only need to use operating systems as "hosts" to run its programs). Soon, Java
virtual machines (VMs) will be available for most operating systems. See id. (pre-
dicting that there will be Java VMs for all major operating systems by end of 1997).
One commentator noted that:
IBM is even porting Java to the AS/400 and MVS, which manage an esti-
mated 70 percent of the world's corporate data. This is why it's not crazy
to predict that by the turn of the century, there will be more copies of the
Java VM in the world than any of the [operating systems] that host it.
Id.
67. See Complaint, supra note 1, 7 (contending that browser technology and
Java will weaken Microsoft's operating system monopoly).
68. See, e.g., Amy Cortese et al., The Software Revolution, Bus. WK., Dec. 4, 1995,
at 78, 78.
69. See, e.g., Lemley & McGowan, Competitive Propriety, supra note 12, at 734
(noting that Java's platform-independence may weaken "network benefits"
Microsoft had enjoyed as result of operating system dominance); see also Mark A.
Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1041,
1077 (1996) (discussing theory that Microsoft is trying to protect its operating sys-
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which casts a shell over the Windows interface, is a step towards the imple-
mentation of this vision.70
In the contempt proceeding, the Government argued that Microsoft
was attempting to forestall this threat to its operating system monopoly by
seeking to expand its share of the browser market and that part of that
effort involved bundling its browser with its operating system.7 1 Although
the Government ignored the several ways in which this tie differed from
classic tying arrangements, the significance of these differences was over-
shadowed by Microsoft's alleged use of the tie as a means of strengthening
monopoly power. The tie under challenge, therefore, was not a routine
tying arrangement raising some doctrinally troublesome issues, but a criti-
cal component of Microsoft's efforts to maintain its Windows monopoly.
In the new antitrust case, the Government has reasserted these tying
claims, casting them in the language not only of section one, but also in
the language of monopolization and attempted monopolization. 72
The Government, however, has not spelled out how Microsoft might
maintain its Windows monopoly by expanding its share of the browser
market. Microsoft's current browser, the Internet Explorer 4.0, carries
Java capability. 73 Under the scenario described above, Java programming
threatens Microsoft's Windows monopoly. As long as all of the major
browsers carry Java virtual machines, however, shifts in the shares of the
browser market among Netscape, Microsoft, Sun and others would leave
Java's threat to Microsoft's Windows monopoly unaffected. Indeed, the
Government's description of the Java-based scenario, under which the
dominance of the Windows platform is eroded away, loses much of its ex-
planatory power if the tie neither furthers nor impedes the progress of
tern monopoly from "new generation of computer operating systems integrated
into Web browsers").
70. See Tom R. Halfhill, Good-Bye, GUI Hello, NU, ByrE, July 1997, at 60, 66
[hereinafter Halfhill, Good-Bye] (claiming that Netscape's creation of full-screen
desktop browser may make windows "irrelevant").
71. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537, 539 (D.D.C. 1997)
(describing tying arrangement by which Microsoft exploits its operation systems
monopoly), rev'd, 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The district court observed that:
[T]he government charges that Microsoft coerces OEMs to license and
distribute the Internet Explorer whether they want to or not, even
though, the government asserts (and Microsoft vehemently denies), re-
fusing to install Microsoft's browser will not affect the functioning of the
underlying Windows 95 operating system in any other significant respect.
The effect, says the government, is a classic "tying" arrangement by which
Microsoft is exploiting its operation systems monopoly in violation of an
express term of the Final Judgment.
Id.
72. See Complaint, supra note 1, 138-41.
73. See PAUL McFEDRIES, WINDOWS 95: UNLEASHED 1242 (1998) [hereinafter
McFEDRIES, WINDOWS 95] (noting that Microsoft's current browser supports Java
technology).
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that scenario.7 4 Perhaps in response to this potential missing link the Gov-
ernment has recently adverted to Microsoft's J/Direct technology, but the
Government does not adequately develop the theory under which J/Di-
rect either interferes with the emergence of the Java paradigm or is itself
an anticompetitive innovation. 7
5
By contrast, Sun explicitly describes the how and why of Microsoft's
response to the Java-based scenario. 76 After explaining why Java threatens
Microsoft's dominance, Sun alleges that Microsoft has set out to under-
mine the promise of Java-based interoperability. 77 Under Sun's theory,
Microsoft is introducing modifications to Java that interfere with Java's
74. See generally Memorandum, supra note 12, at 39 (acknowledging that
United States cannot predict whether browsers will succeed in "commoditizing"
operating systems and thereby diminish Microsoft's market power). Not only does
the Government fail to connect the tie with the maintenance of the Microsoft mo-
nopoly, but the Government concedes that it has no objection to Microsoft ulti-
mately dominating the browser market, so long as a browser/operating-system tie
plays no role in its achieving that dominance. See id. (stating that its action is "in-
tended only to ensure that the market remains able to choose between the com-
peting technologies . . .and that Microsoft does not use the market power of
Windows 95 to distort market choice in its favor"). The Government wants to em-
ploy a network-externalities argument, but because it is too cautious to develop it
fully, the Government falls back on doctrinal arguments. See id. (stating that it is
free market principles that should decide "battle" between Microsoft and its
competitors).
75. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1998-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 7 72,621
(D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998) (No. 98-1232) ("Microsoft entered into a series of anti-
competitive agreements with customers and competitors to restrict the use of Java
and to substitute the use of Microsoft's version of Java, known as 'J/Direct."')
76. See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, 7 52-54 (alleging that Microsoft
has embarked on course of conduct to disrupt and impair standardized program-
ming environment created by Sun's JAVA technology).
77. See id. 7 53-54 (asserting that Microsoft's actions threaten Java's unique
"cross-platform programming environment"). Sun's Amended Complaint de-
scribed Java's threat to Microsoft in the following manner:
In contrast to the open systems cross-platform programming environ-
ment uniquely created by Sun's JAVA Technology, the programming en-
vironments established by defendant Microsoft's various operating
systems are platform-dependent, such that programs created for it's Win32
and other programming environments will operate only on platforms
running defendant Microsoft's operating systems, and will not run on any
other systems platform. In a further effort to maintain control and domi-
nance over the programming environment created by its operating sys-
tems, defendant Microsoft refuses to license other systems manufacturers,
such as Sun and others, to use Microsoft's technology or intellectual
property rights to produce operating systems that implement the Win32
programming environment.
Id. 50. Sun then charged Microsoft with extending their dominant market share
position in desktop systems by causing independent software developers either to
"create versions of their programs only for the Win32 programming environment,
or to so favor the development of Win32-based programs over all other program-
ming environments as to render alternative programming environments for the
desktop commercially unattractive for program development." Id. 51.
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platform independence. 78 If Java can be fragmentized into different ver-
sions, then the largest market would be Windows users and Microsoft's
power would remain intact.
79
The contentions of the Government and Sun each make reference to
the same scenario. Both draw upon the Java-based scenario under which
the Windows monopoly is replaced by a browser platform. In the con-
tempt proceeding, the Government implied (rather than asserted) that
once Microsoft Explorer became the dominant browser, Microsoft would
attempt to undermine the Java potential for engendering a new world of
platform-independent computer applications. In its new antitrust case,
the Government has explicitly charged that Microsoft's attempts to in-
crease its share of the browser market are motivated by fear of this Java-
based scenario.8 0 Although Sun's case does not raise antitrust issues, Sun
does incorporate market-structure issues into its lawsuit.8 1 Indeed, Sun
articulated the missing part of the Government's real case. Sun, like the
78. See id. 1 54 (alleging that Microsoft intends to disrupt JAVA's cross-plat-
form compatibility). Sun alleged that Microsoft "has embarked on a course of
conduct to disrupt and impair" the standardized approach of Java technology "by
deliberately implementing Sun's JAVA Technology in products Microsoft distrib-
utes in a manner that breaks the cross-platform compatibility of the JAVA program-
ming environment .... Id.
79. See id. 1 86. Sun also expressed concern that continual modifications to
the Java technology distributed by Microsoft through its Software Development Kit
for Java (SDKJ) and Internet Explorer 4.0 have caused and will continue to cause
widespread and irreparable harm to:
a) Persons usingJava Compatible browsers other than Internet Explorer
4.0, who are harmed because some programs written by developers using
Microsoft's SDKJ are not fully functional on their browsers; b) Software
developers using SDKJ, who are harmed because, unbeknownst to them,
some of the programs they develop are not fully functional on browsers
other than Internet Explorer 4.0; c) Browser developers other than
Microsoft, who are harmed because some programs written to run by de-
velopers who use Microsoft's SDKJ developer's tool kit are not fully func-
tional on browsers other than Internet Explorer 4.0, and this failure is
and will likely continue to be mistakenly attributed to such browsers or to
Sun's Java Technology; d) Enterprises developing programs for the Java
programming environment, who are harmed because the promise of
cross-platform compatibility on which they rely is being impaired as a re-
sult of Microsoft's efforts to fragment the Java programming environ-
ment; and e) Sun, which is harmed because the cross-platform
compatibility created by the Java Technology has been and will continue
to be impaired, and Sun, not Microsoft is and will continue to be wrong-
fully identified by developers as the source of their problems.
Id. 196.
80. See Complaint, supra note 1, 11 8, 68, 73, 107, 122 (containing allegations
about threat of competing internet browsers to Microsoft's Windows dominance).
81. See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, 11 48-54 (containing allegations of
Microsoft's market dominance). Sun pointed to Microsoft's "dominant market
share position" in distributing MS-DOS, Windows 3.1 and Windows 95 operating
systems. See id. 1 49. Sun further alleged that in 1996, over 85% of the desktop
systems throughout the world utilized and were dependent on Microsoft's operat-
ing systems. See id.
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Government, brought up the threat to Microsoft's operating systems domi-
nance posed by Java, but in a more articulate and precise manner, Sun
explicitly connected that threat to an alleged reaction by Microsoft. 8 2 Sun
alleged that Microsoft was modifying Java to undermine Java's promise of
interoperability, thereby restoring Microsoft's Windows-based
dominance. 83
The following sections explore the issues surrounding Java's threat to
Microsoft. These sections argue that the Government's tying (and related
monopolization and attempted monopolization) case is weak, both on the
doctrinal terms in which the Government has chosen to state it and on the
assumption that Microsoft is seeking to employ an expanding share of the
browser market to block the advance of superior technology-a conten-
tion that the Government asserts by implication. As a part of the antitrust
discussion, this Article examines the contentions of Sun Microsystems
which could contribute to that antitrust analysis.
C. The Technology
1. Operating Systems
All computer systems employ an operating system that acts as a link
between application programs and the machine.8 4 The operating system
links application programs to the machine while coordinating their opera-
tion with an array of functions, such as printing or copying, that are nor-
82. See id. 1 52 ("Microsoft seeks to extend the dominance it currently enjoys
over desktop operating systems and the programming environments they create to
browser programs and other applications through its manufacture and distribu-
tion of Internet Explorer 4.0 and its Software Development Kit for JAVA
('SDKJ')"). Sun alleged that Microsoft's reaction to Java's threat to its operating
systems dominance was its manufacture and distribution of Internet Explorer 4.0
and its SDKJ. See id. 7 48-54 (containing allegations about Microsoft's strategy
concerning Java).
83. See id. 75-77 (detailing Microsoft's alterations of Sun's Java's Develop-
ment Kit (JDK) 1.1). Among other charges, Sun asserted that SDKJ both added
and deleted elements of Sun's JDK 1.1 and failed to contain or support critical
portions of Sun's JDK 1.1 upgrade to the Java technology. See id. In particular,
Sun alleged that Microsoft altered and modified Sun's set ofJava application pro-
gramming interfaces (APIs) contained in JDK 1.1 by deleting the Java Native
Method Interface JNI). See id. 79. It also allegedly eliminated the package of
supplemental class libraries called "Remote Method Invocation" (RMI), and did
not otherwise make RMI separately available through alternative channels of distri-
bution as required by the TLD Agreement. See id.
84. See STEVEN MANES & PAUL ANDREWS, GATES: How MIcRoSoFr's MOGUL
REINVENTED AN INDUSTRY-AND MADE HIMSELF THE RICHEST MAN IN AMERICA 107-08
(1994) (discussing function of computer operating system). An operating system
coordinates the different demands that software places on the hard drive. See id. A
computer without an operating system is unable to do such simple tasks as store
files on a disk, or send information to a printer, without specific directions from a
programmer. See id. The operating system acts as a built-in programmer and per-
forms these functions on demand. See id.
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mally desired by users, but which are not contained within applications
programs.
85
Since the early 1980s, Microsoft has produced the dominant operat-
ing system for IBM-compatible personal computers.8 6 Because IBM-com-
patible personal computers dominate the personal computer market,
Microsoft's operating systems have dominated the market for personal
computer operating systems. The Microsoft operating system began as a
16-bit MS-DOS designed for the original IBM personal computer and
evolved through several stages. 87 The introduction of the Windows graph-
ical user interface in the early 1990s met a major user need and solidified
the dominance of the Microsoft platform, which then consisted of its DOS
operating system and a Windows overlay. 88 A further transformation of
the Microsoft platform occurred in 1995 when Windows 95 was intro-
duced. 89 Windows 95 is a transitional operating system that (while back-
wardly compatible with 16-bit applications) moves personal computer use
to a 32-bit platform. Currently, almost all newly manufactured personal
computers equipped with an Intel microprocessor and destined for the
consumer market are equipped at the factory with Microsoft's Windows 98
operating system. 90 Most personal computers manufactured between Au-
85. See Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5 (explaining interaction between
computer operating system and other computer devices). As stated in the Govern-
ment's Memorandum in the contempt proceeding, "the operating system is the
software that controls the operation of the PC and manages the interaction be-
tween the computer's memory and attached hardware devices such as the key-
board, display screen, disk drives, and printer." Id.
86. See Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, supra note 33, at 624-28 (describing
Microsoft's dominance of PC operating systems since early 1980s); see also LISA
Bucii, PCS: 6 IN 1 8 (1997) ("Every personal computer comes with the operating
system software. Microsoft Windows 95 ships on most new personal computers
today .. ");JAMES WALLACE, OvERDRIvE: BILL GATES AND THE RACE TO CONTROL
CYBERSPACE 8 (1997) ("First with DOS and then with Windows, Microsoft had be-
come dominant because it controlled the operating system for most of the world's
personal computers.").
87. See generally Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, supra note 33, at 624-28 (com-
menting on Microsoft's development of its operating system through six successive
stages).
88. See MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 84, at 6 (detailing development of
graphical user interface). One commentator has noted that the graphical user
interface concept "was invented neither by Bill Gates nor by Microsoft." Id. In-
stead, Windows was a descendant of "earlier graphical user interfaces, most notably
the experimental versions from Xerox's Palo Alto Research Center ... and the
commercial version from Apple Computer's Macintosh." Id.
89. See ED TILEY, WINDOWS 95 UNLEASHED 4 (1998) (stating that Windows 95 is
full-blown operating system, not just layer over DOS).
90. See Russ Mitchell & Marianne Lavelle, Lots of Legal Bugs: Microsoft Has Been
Rushing to Roll Out Windows 98, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 27, 1998, at 54, 54
(noting that by July 1998, all new computers sold by Compaq, Gateway 2000, Dell
and others will have Windows 98 installed on hard drive).
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gust 1995 and May 1998 were equipped with Windows 95.91 Most older
machines are equipped with a version of MS-DOS and Windows 3.1 graph-
ical interface overlay, both products of Microsoft. 9 2
Operating systems coordinate the functions performed by the various
hardware components of a personal computer: the keyboard, the screen,
the random access memory (RAM), the functioning of the hard drive, the
printer, etc.93 They also generally contain several utility programs, such as
programs for formatting data carriers.94 Over time-sometimes in re-
sponse to the growth of memory provided by the hardware-operating
systems have absorbed new functions.95 A comprehensive file manage-
ment system is one example. As late as 1995, one author commented that
although "[a] 11 operating systems must... provide several utility programs
supporting the general use of the PC system," nonetheless "an extremely
powerful and user-friendly file manager, which would support common
file management tasks, such as copying, moving, or deleting files, is more
difficult to find."96 Early personal computer operating systems lacked
such file management capabilities. Microsoft operating systems, for exam-
ple, began to carry such a file manager (called DOSSHELL) in MS-DOS
version 4.0.9 7 Printing is another function that has sometimes existed in-
dependently. Printing is now accomplished through coordinated action
between applications software and the operating system, at least those car-
rying Microsoft and Macintosh operating systems. 98 In UNIX systems,
91. See generally BucKI, supra note 86, at 14 (stating that, in 1997, most con-
sumers purchase computers run by Windows 95 operating system); WALLACE, supra
note 86, at 279 (discussing Windows 95 sales).
92. See generally ULRICH SCHUELLER & HANSs-GEORG VEDDELER, UPGRADING &
MAINTAINING YOUR PC 195-200 (3d ed. 1995) (providing brief history of Windows).
93. See BucKi, supra note 86, at 8 (explaining that purpose of operating sys-
tem software is to instruct computer how to start up, communicate with all its de-
vices and work with other software).
94. See SCHUELLER & VEDDELER, supra note 92, at 183 (discussing operating
system programs); see also DAVIS, supra note 12, at 2-3 (illustrating functions per-
formed by operating system). One commentator explained that:
The operating system's routines perform key support functions such as
communicating with peripheral devices and accepting and carrying out
user commands (load a program, copy a file, create a directory ... ).
These seemingly simple tasks are, in reality, deceptively complex. They
are also common to most applications, and it makes little sense to dupli-
cate them in each and every application program.
Id.
95. See RONALD E. ANDERSON & DAVID R. SULLIVAN, WORLD OF COMPUTING 114
(1988) (describing evolution of operating systems); SCHUELLER & VEDDELER, supra
note 92, at 183 (observing development in personal computer operating systems as
result of constantly evolving hardware technology).
96. Id.
97. See Operating Instructions; 1,001 Tips: Operating Environments, PC COMPUT-
ING, Aug. 1994, at 108, 133 (discussing DOSSHELL file-management utility that
Microsoft introduced in Version 4.0).
98. See Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5 (explaining interaction between
computer operating system and other computer functions, including printing).
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however, printing is an independent function. 99 Perhaps the most dra-
matic (and visible) function absorbed by an operating system has been the
graphical user interface. 10 0 Early Microsoft operating systems did not
have a graphical user interface. When Microsoft introduced its Windows
graphical user interface in the early 1990s, it first appeared as an overlay
on the operating system (as in Windows 3.1).101 Later-with Windows
95-it was fully integrated into the operating system.' 0 2
2. The Internet and the World Wide Web
The internet is a vast network created by the interconnection of serv-
ers with computer users through telephone lines.103 The World Wide
Web is that part of the internet that uses Hypertext Transport Protocol
(HTrP) to link documents across the internet.10 4 It consists of (1) servers
that provide "pages" and other material and (2) browsers employed by
viewers to "read" the material provided by servers.' 0 5 Therefore, the
software written for servers must be compatible with the capabilities of
browsers; otherwise, the material dispensed by the servers would be un-
readable. Currently, most material deployed on web servers is written in
HTML language, often on a UNIX operating system.' 0 6 HTML is in the
process of being replaced by DHTML, and HTML programming is being
99. See generally KEVIN REICHARD & ERIC F. JOHNSON, TEACH YOURSELF ...
UNIX 77 (3d ed. 1995) (noting that UNIX operates as hierarchical file system,
with every function, including printing, located in separate file).
100. See PHILIP E. MARGOLIS, PERSONAL COMPUTER DICTIONARY 217 (2d ed.
1996) (defining graphical user interface (GUI)). A GUI takes advantage of the
computer's graphics capabilities to make the program easier to use. See id.
Microsoft Windows' GUI features the following basic components: (1) pointer-a
small symbol that appears on the screen that allows the user to select various op-
tions; (2) pointing device-the physical device that enables the user to direct the
pointer across the screen; (3) icons-small pictures that represent commands that
are easier to identify for the user; (4) desktop-the area on the computer screen
where the icons are grouped; (5) windows-the ability to divide the computer
screen into different areas; and (6) menus-the ability to execute commands fron
selections on a menu. See id. at 217-18.
101. See MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 84, at 6-8 (discussing evolution of
graphical interface).
102. See MARK MINASI, THE EXPERT GUIDE TO WINDOWS 95 2-7 (1996) (noting
multiple improvements in Windows 95's GUI as compared to older Windows'
GUI).
103. SeeJohn Markoff, Microsoft Seems Near Deal to Invest in US West Cable TV,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1997, at DI [hereinafter Markoff, Microsoft Seems Near Deal]
(indicating that most households connect to internet via conventional telephone
lines).
104. See How the WWWIs Put Together, BYrE, Aug. 1995, at 138, 138 (discussing
constitution of World Wide Web and indicating that HTTP is most important pro-
tocol used by Web).
105. See id. (explaining interaction of server and browser).
106. See Tom Yager, NT and the Net, By'rE, July 1996, at 133, 133 (noting that
UNIX has thus far dominated Web development).
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increasingly supplemented with Java additions.1 0 7 So far, Java has been
concentrated in the production of "applets," dynamic portions of web
pages that can interact with a viewer through the provision of small
spreadsheet programs, animation or video clips.10 8 Standardization in in-
ternet communication is overseen by the World Wide Web Consortium
("W3C"), which administers the content of a number of protocols gov-
erning internet communication.10 9
3. Browsers
Browsers are a relatively new invention. 10 The first browser with a
convenient graphical user interface, the Mosaic, was developed in 1993 at
the National Center for Supercomputer Applications (NCSA) at the Uni-
versity of Illinois."' Mosaic was followed by the Netscape Navigator,
which, for a substantial period, was given away free-of-charge to capture
107. See generally Rick Dobson, Dynamic HTML and Scriplets Add Life, BY=E, Jan.
1998, at 79, 79 (providing insight into dynamic hypertext markup language).
Although initially Microsoft and Netscape were implementing DHTML differently,
the WC3 is expected to issue a clarifying standard, ending the disparity. See id.
(noting that Microsoft and Netscape have committed to "interoperability pledge,"
stating that their browsers will comply with WC3 specifications). XML, extensible
markup language, may ultimately displace DHTML. See Scott Mace et al., Weaving
a Better Web, BYrE, Mar. 1998, at 58, 62-65 (noting momentum behind XML and
predicting that XML will become vehicle for publishing SGML-based information
on Web).
108. See Dobson, supra note 107, at 79 (discussing how applets include proper-
ties that can enliven web pages); see also Stephen J. Vaughan-Nichols & Rachel
Schmutter, How the Web Will Change Computing, BYrE, Jan. 1996, at 24, 24 (describ-
ing how applets can include data-entry forms, spreadsheets, animations and
graphics).
109. See, e.g., David Lytel, Nonprofit Parents, Corporate Kids, UPSIDE, Mar. 1998,
at 66, 66 (discussing need for internet oversight); see also Michael Moeller, Stan-
dards Could Put Bite on Unwanted Web Data; Consortium Creating Hypertext Extensions
ForFiltering Content, PC WK, Sept. 11, 1995, at 1, 1 (noting that consortium is devel-
oping extensions to hypertext that will allow user opportunity to screen, rate and
filter internet content).
110. See Peter Elstrom et al., Silicon Valley: Beyond the Valley, Bus. WK., Aug. 25,
1997, at 138, 138 (describing history of first web browser). Marc Andreessen, Vice-
President of Netscape, while a student at the University of Illinois in the early
1990s, helped to develop the Mosaic, the first convenient browser with easy-to-use
graphical format. See id. Mosaic was released to the public in April 1993. See Steve
Hamm, The Education of Mark Andreessen, Bus. WK., Apr. 13, 1998, at 84, 86. After a
dispute with the University of Illinois over the rights to Mosaic, Andreessen helped
to form Netscape. See Elstrom et al., supra, at 138. Netscape then marketed the
first commercial browser in 1994, followed by several improved versions thereafter.
See Robert D. Hof, Netspeed at Netscape, Bus. WK., Feb. 10, 1997, at 79, 81 [hereinaf-
ter Hof, Netspeed]. Spyglass, Inc. won the right to market Mosaic in 1994. See Peter
Elstrom & Kathy Rebello, A Big Bet on Minibrowsers, Bus. WK., Oct. 28, 1996, at 56,
56.
111. See Hamm, supra note 110, at 86 (providing time line of Mosaic's
development).
1999]
19
Gifford: Java and Microsoft: How Does the Antitrust Story Unfold
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
market share and stimulate the market for servers.1 12 By 1995, Netscape
commanded over eighty percent of the browser market.1 1 3 In that year,
Netscape incorporated Java technology into its Navigator 2.0.114 Since
that time, websites have been able to use Java applets to enhance their
capabilities and overall attractiveness. 115 Netscape's success in the
browser market engendered a vast production of material for servers and
encouraged entry by others into the browser market. Microsoft shipped
its first browser in 1994, released its improved Explorer 2.0 in mid-1995
and was giving it away by year's end.1 16 The Explorer has been increasing
its market share since 1995.117 By 1997, both Netscape and Microsoft had
issued highly sophisticated versions of their respective browsers, the Net-
scape Communicator and the Microsoft Internet Explorer 4.0.118 Sun
Microsystems also produces a browser, which it calls "HotJava." 119 The
current versions of these browsers are equipped with Java capability. As a
result of Microsoft's increasing penetration of the browser market, Net-
scape announced in early 1998 that it would soon resume its earlier prac-
112. See Ben Smith, Internet With Style, ByrE, Jan. 1995, at 197, 198 (discussing
Netscape's business practice); see also Ellis Booker, Netscape Keeps on Rolling, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Mar. 6, 1995, at 32, 32 (referring to "Netscape's most canny move:
Leveraging a free-for-the-taking piece of client software as a means of selling a
server product"); Peter H. Lewis, Business Technology: Netscape Knows Fame and As-
pires to Fortune, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at Dl (revealing strategy behind Net-'
scape's practice of giving away bulk of its software for free).
113. See generally Heather Green, Has Netscape Hit the "Innovation Ceiling"?,
Bus. WK., Jan. 19, 1998, at 69, 69 (indicating that in web browser market, Net-
scape's share had fallen from high of 85% to 60% by January 1998).
114. See Dragan & Seltzer, supra note 51, at 100 (stating that in 1995, Netscape
incorporated Java support in Navigator 2.0).
115. See id. (stating that most widespread use of Java is on Web "where devel-
opers have employed it for creating applets-interactive page elements or basic
applications that you view within a browser"). Java-enabled browsers include
HotJava, Microsoft Internet Explorer, Netscape Communicator and Netscape Navi-
gator. See id.
116. See Kathy Rebello et al., Inside Microsoft, Bus. WK.,July 15, 1996, at 56, 56
(explaining Microsoft's browser development). Spyglass, Inc. won the right to Mo-
saic, and licensed the Mosaic technology to Microsoft when the latter decided to
enter the browser market. See Elstrom & Rebello, supra note 110, at 56 (noting
Spyglass' attempt to get back into browser market). See generally Senate Hearing,
supra note 10 (discussing testimony of Bill Gates regarding licensing arrangement
with Spyglass).
117. See William Echikson, Bill is a Target in Europe, Too, Bus. WK. INT'L EDI-
TION, Feb. 23, 1998, at 14, 14 (stating that market share of Microsoft's Internet
Explorer was 40% worldwide). According to the Justice Department, Microsoft
held approximately a 50% share of the browser market in May 1998. See Com-
plaint, supra note 1, 64, 126.
118. See Downloads and Software, PC/COMPUTING, Aug. 1998, at 138, 138 (stat-
ing that Microsoft Internet Explorer 4.01 and Netscape Communicator 4.05 are
"so complete they make older versions pale in comparison").
119. SeeAndrew Singleton, Wired on the Web, BYrE, Jan. 1996, at 77, 77 (discuss-
ing development of HotJava).
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tice of giving its browser away. 120 In addition, Netscape announced that it
would make the source code for its browser generally available.
1 2 1
The practice of giving browsers away is neither economically irra-
tional nor predatory behavior. 12 2 Both Netscape and Microsoft apparently
regard the browser "market" as essentially a means for advancing their
position in the server market.1 23 Both companies market packages of
server/browser software for intranet use (i.e., for use internally within the
networks of private business enterprises). 124 They also believe that they
can increase the marketability of their server software as they increase
their share of the browser market.
125
4. Java
Java is a programming language with characteristics that fulfill, or
have the potential for fulfilling, a number of current or perceived needs in
programming and in internet communication. 12 6 Java possesses capabili-
ties that are lacking in C++, which up until now has been the most widely
employed programming language. 127 Indeed, Java grew out of C++ and
embodies much of the C++ language. 128 Java did, however, discard cer-
tain C++ elements that heightened error vulnerability.1 2 9 Currently, one
120. See Don Clark, Netscape to Share Browser Code, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 1998, at
B6 (indicating that Microsoft's successful assault on web browser market will cause
Netscape to begin giving away its browser software again).
121. See id. (discussing Netscape's plan to share its programming code, which
will allow other companies to enhance it).
122. But see Lemley, supra note 69, at 1075 (describing behavior of both Net-
scape and Microsoft in giving away browsers as "competitive predation"). Lemley
has suggested that there is reason to be concerned about such behavior only to the
extent that one firm is better able to survive the period of below-cost pricing. See
id. at 1075-76. The Government has questioned Microsoft's behavior in giving the
browser away, but it does not refer to a similar practice by Netscape. See Com-
plaint, supra note 1, 120, 121 (containing allegations about giving away
browser).
123. For a discussion of Netscape's business practices, see supra note 112 and
accompanying text.
124. See Sunny Baker & Kim Baker, The 1998 Strategist's Guide to Software, Bus.
STRATEGY, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 39, 43 (discussing Netscape's foray into "superserver
domain" and Microsoft's Internet Information Server bundled with its NT Server
Software).
125. See Robert D. Hof, An Instant Success! So Where's the Payoff?, Bus. WK.,June
15, 1998, at 126, 126 [hereinafter Hof, Instant Success] (noting that Netscape's
practice of giving away web browser is means to build demand for its lucrative
server software).
126. For a discussion of the uses and unique qualities of Java, see infra notes
127-43 and accompanying text.
127. See Ralph Spindell, New Development Tools Keep Java Percolating, ELEC-
TRONIC DESIGN, July 20, 1998, at 35, 35 (explaining how Java could replace C++ or
Virtual Basic as programming language of choice for professionals).
128. See DAVID FLANAGAN, JAVA IN A NUTSHELL 14 (2d ed. 1997) (stating that
Java borrows terminology and syntax from C++).
129. See Richard V. Dragan, Java Tools Get Rea4 PC MAG.,Jan. 7, 1997, at 181,
181 [hereinafter Dragan, Java Tools] ("Java's safer language features, such as built-
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of Java's important uses is that of facilitating the construction of small
computer programs, generally referred to as applets, that enable a web
page to interact with a user's computer, providing enhancement to the
web page in the form of animation, video clips or other dynamic mate-
rial.1 3 0 In addition to superior capabilities as a language, Java also has the
potential for interoperability, allowing a program written in Java to run on
any platform, including Windows/Intel, OS/2, Macintosh, Linux and
UNIX.13 1 Java is independent of the processor architecture and of the
operating system in the host computer.1 3 2
Java is platform-independent because, unlike other software, standard
Java is not compiled into machine code. Rather than compiling source
code into object code designed for a particular platform as compilers gen-
erally do, Java compilers transform Java source code into 'Java byte
code." 133 It is these Java byte codes that are designed to be executed on
any system that has a Java byte code interpreter (or Java virtual
machine).13 4 These virtual machines, which are designed specifically for
the various platforms (Windows, Macintosh, OS/2, UNIX or other), per-
form the bridging function connecting the Java program to the operating
system and thence to the hardware.1 3 5
Thus, programs written in Java go through an extra step. Because
they are compiled into Java byte code (rather than into object code), they
must interface with the interpreter (or virtual machine) in the host
machine prior to execution. 13 6 This extra step slows the execution ofJava
programs. 13 7 The slowness of Java programs has been repeatedly cited in
in garbage collection and the elimination of pointers, offer an elegant, up-to-date
interpretation of C++ without that language's worst traps.").
130. See PAUL McFEDRIES, THE COMPLETE IDIOT's GUIDE TO CREATING AN
HTML 4 WEB PAGE 194 (3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter MCFEDRIES, IDIOT's GUIDE] (ex-
ploring uses and unique qualities of Java).
131. See FLANAGAN, supra note 128, at 5 (explaining that writing program in
Java allows user to run it on all platforms).
132. See id. at 4 (stating thatJava applications can run on any system because
they are compiled to "an architecture-neutral byte-code format").
133. See Tom R. Halfhill, Java Chips Boost Applet Speed, BYrE, Apr. 1996, at 25,
25 [hereinafter Halfhill, Java Chips] (explaining that Java compiler translates
source code into condensed format known as byte code).
134. See id. (noting thatJava byte code can run on any computer that hasJava
virtual machine).
135. See generally Amjad Umar, Application Development: Inside Web App Func-
tioning, INFO. WK., Sept. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14148086 (explaining that
Java virtual machines interpret Java byte codes and run them on hardware).
136. See Kelvin Nilsen, Adding Real-Time Capabilities to Java, COMM. OF THE
ACM, June 1998, at 49, 49 (noting that every Java program is applied to virtual
machine's byte code analyzer before it is executed).
137. See Elaine X. Elliot, New CPUs Make Java Faster, But Less Open: Sun Offers
Low-Cost Dedicated Chips to Improve Performance, COMPUTER SHOPPER, June 1996, at
66, 66 (noting that virtual machine interpretation reduces speed of Java
applications).
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computer magazines. 138 A related problematic aspect of Java-also con-
nected with its interoperability characteristic-lies in "bugs," or failures
encountered when Java input fails to mesh well with one or more user
platforms.'3 9 Java, of course, is at an early stage in its development, and
these problems may well be resolved in the next few years as its develop-
ment proceeds.'
40
One method for speeding the operation of Java is a "just-in-time"
(JIT) Java compiler rather than a Java interpreter.1 4 ' A JIT compiler is
faster than an interpreter because the JIT compiler keeps native machine
code sequences in its memory and uses them when the sequence reap-
pears. 142 The Microsoft Internet Explorer 4.0, for example, employs aJIT
Java compiler for its Java virtual machine, thereby speeding the transmis-
sion of Java-language programs.
14 3
5. Java Rivals
Although Java possesses highly desirable capabilities, it is not without
rivals. A recently developed rival to Java is IBM's universal virtual
machine, which is designed to enable programs written in Smalltalk, Basic
and Java to be translated into six platforms: Windows NT, Windows 95,
Hewlett-Packard's HP-UX, Sun's Solaris, and IBM's AIX and OS/2.144 An-
other Java rival is Microsoft's ActiveX.
138. See, e.g., Sharon Gaudin, Java's Speed, Cross-Platform Issues Targeted, COM-
PurERwoRLD, Apr. 7, 1997, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Gaudin, Java's Speed] (stating that
Java is too slow). In fact, Sun has been developing a special picojava chip as a
means of enhancing Java performance. See Peter Wayner, Sun Gambles on Java
Chips, Br, Nov. 1996, at 79, 79. Although picoJava chips have been said to out-
perform Pentiums with JIT Java compilers, this route to enhancing Java speed is
dependent upon the employment of dedicated hardware by users. See id. at 79-80
("Sun says the picoJava chips could be five times faster than a Pentium with aJIT
compiler .... Nevertheless, the actual performance improvement you get will
depend on whether the Java program is heavy on computation and light on object
juggling."). In addition to their role in dedicated Java computers, Java processors
could also be used as high-speed Java coprocessors in general purpose computers.
See Halfhill, Java Chips, supra note 133, at 25.
139. See Gaudin, Java's Speed, supra note 138, at 1 ("[T]here are glitches in its
much-touted cross-platform compatibility.").
140. See Tom R. Halfhill, Java Gets Down to Business, BrE, Oct. 1997, at 87, 88
[hereinafter Halfhill, Java Gets Down] (noting that computer coders are confident
that Java development will get smoother as tools keep getting better).
141. See Wayner, supra note 138, at 79 (noting that just-in-time (JIT) compil-
ers can run Java code even faster than interpreters).
142. See Stephan Somogyi & Jason Snell, Java Finally Delivers, MACWORLD, May
1, 1998, at 81, 81 (stating that JIT compilers are faster than typical virtual ma-
chines because typical virtual machines do not have memory capacity that compil-
ers do).
143. See Halfhill & Gallant, supra note 60, at 70 (explaining how Microsoft
Internet Explorer 4.0 performs faster with JIT compiler).
144. See Sharon Gaudin, IBM Plan Builds on Java, COMPUTERWORLD, June 23,
1997, at 61, 62 [hereinafter Gaudin, IBM Plan] (discussing benefits of IBM's uni-
versal virtual machine).
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Introduced in March 1996, ActiveX is not a computer language like
Java, but rather a framework embodying a series of application program-
ming interfaces (APIs) that facilitate interaction between the host com-
puter and internet sites in new or existing object-link-embedding (OLE)
code.145 ActiveX grew out of Microsoft's development work on com-
pound documents, work that spawned a broader infrastructure technology
concerned with enabling one unit of software to interact with another.1 46
Like Java, ActiveX enables programmers to embed small programs (analo-
gous to the Java applets) into websites. 147 ActiveX is designed for use in
web browsers, but is geared specifically for the Windows environment. 148
Microsoft takes the view that ActiveX and Java are complementary tools
that can work together. 149 In fact, the Java virtual machine contained in
the Internet Explorer 4.0 is encased in an ActiveX interface. 150
III. PATH DEPENDENCY, NETWORK ErEcrs AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COMPUTER SoFTWARE
A. The Economics
Network externalities and path dependency theory help to explain
the dominance of Microsoft in the market for personal computer operat-
ing systems. As discussed below, these concepts have relevance to the de-
velopment of the Java platform paradigm, but they must be applied with
caution. 15 1
145. See Kim S. Nash, Active X Spells Java Alternative, COMPUTERwORLD, Mar. 18,
1996, at 14, 14 (describing development of ActiveX).
146. See David Chappell & David S. Linthicum, ActiveX Demystified, BYrE, Sept.
1997, at 56, 58 (explaining origin of ActiveX and how it allows interaction between
different pieces of software). ActiveX is derived from Microsoft's Component Ob-
ject Model (COM). See id. at 56 (describing ActiveX's relationship to Microsoft's
COM. COM grew out of Microsoft's object-link-embedding (OLE) technology, a
technology designed to create compound documents. See id. at 58. COM was con-
tained in the second release of OLE, OLE 2. COM, however, possessed broader
capabilities than those needed for compound documents. See id. COM embodied
technology facilitating one piece of software to interact with another. See id.
Although COM is employed in a whole array of Microsoft products, it is a subset of
COM technologies that constitutes ActiveX. See id. at 56 (stating that ActiveX is
built from COM technologies).
147. See Colin Savage, Sound Off: Java vs. ActiveX: You Say You Want a Revolu-
tion, COMPUTERWORLD, May 12, 1997, at 80, 80 (describing beneficial aspects of
ActiveX).
148. See id. ("ActiveX is useful only for extending Windows applications.").
149. See Apple's Future Tied to Java, NEWSBYrES, May 28, 1996, available in 1996
WL 10475865 ("The Microsoft model is to couple Java and ActiveX together. Ac-
cording to Microsoft, Java will work better wrapped in the Microsoft ActiveX
system.").
150. See Richard V. Dragan, What's the Code?, COMPUTER SHOPPER, Apr. 1,
1998, at 522, 522 [hereinafter Dragan, Code] (explaining how Java and ActiveX
work together on Internet Explorer).
151. For a discussion of network externalities and path dependency theory,
see infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
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Both network externalities and path dependency theory apply to
many products whose value increases as a result of the growth of a network
in which the product participates. 15 2 The paradigmatic example is the
telephone. One telephone is worthless, but its value increases as more
telephones are added to the telephone network. Personal computer oper-
ating systems, like telephones, tend to grow in value as they increase in
number. Thus, the larger is the number of users of an operating system
(i.e., the greater the installed base), the greater is the incentive of software
applications developers to write programs for that system. Developers may
write programs for other operating systems as well, but the market repre-
sented by the dominant operating system is their first priority because it is
the largest. As a result, the dominant operating system will have more
software available for use than other operating systems. This fact, in turn,
increases the attractiveness of the dominant operating system to new com-
puter users who tend to select that system in preference to rival systems.
153
This is the phenomenon known as network externalities.154 The value of
the operating system increases, not because of any inherent physical attri-
bute, but merely because of its relationships with other products that can
be used with it. As more buyers select the now-dominant operating sys-
tem, that operating system grows still further, which, in turn, generates
even stronger incentives in software developers to write for the dominant
system.155 The growth of the operating system and the growth of applica-
tions software programs exert mutually reinforcing effects spiraling in
their intensity over time. As the operating system becomes increasingly
attractive as a result of the interaction of its growth with the software appli-
cations industry, it becomes ever more difficult for a rival operating system
to gain widespread acceptance. Theorists conceptualize this process as
path dependency, the ultimate result determined by prior events-the
prior events here being the positive feedback provided by the mutually
152. See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In
by Histoical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 122 (1989) (discussing how path efficiency is
provable only in constant and diminishing returns scenarios); Michael L. Katz &
Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8J. EcoN. PERSP. 93, 94 (1994)
[hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition] (explaining how value of mem-
bership to users is affected when other users join); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E.
Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135
(1994) (defining network externalities).
153. See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 152, at 94 ("IT]he
availability of software will depend on what other consumers do, which gives rise to
positive-feedback effects.").
154. See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 152, at 135 ("The circumstance in
which the net value of an action (consuming a good, subscribing to telephone
service) is affected by the number of agents taking equivalent actions will be called
a network effect."). Network externalities show a "specific kind of network effect
in which the equilibrium exhibits unexploited gains from trade regarding network
participation." Id.
155. See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 152, at 94 (stating that
availability of software will depend on what consumers do, and that this gives rise
to positive-feedback effects).
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reinforcing and interdependent growth in applications software and oper-
ating systems. The further along in the process the operating system
moves, the more network externalities augment its value and the stronger
its lead becomes over rivals. 156
To the extent that the concepts of network externalities and path de-
pendency apply to operating systems, they measure the extent to which a
dominant operating system enhances social welfare. The dominance of
one system reflects the value placed by users on the network. 157 That
dominance is evidence that no alternative operating system possesses such
technical superiority as to outweigh the combination of the technical mer-
its of the dominant system plus the value of the network.1 5 8 Conversely,
the existence of nondominant systems reflects the values that users place
on the technical merits of these smaller systems.1 59 The existence of a
nondominant system shows that its users have found the combination of
the technical merits of that system plus the value of the smaller network to
outweigh the value of the larger network and the technology on which the
larger network rests. 160
Economies of scale also help to reinforce network effects. An operat-
ing system possesses the theoretical attributes of a natural monopoly-it is
characterized by high fixed cost incurred in research and development
and minimal marginal costs in production and sales. 16 1 Because operat-
ing systems, like all software, are replicable at minimal cost, the major cost
connected with increased sales is technical backup support and whatever
monitoring is necessary to discourage illegitimate copying. 162 Economies
of scale, however, do not explain why a particular operating system is dota-
156. See Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, supra note 33, at 647-48 (explaining
movement towards path dependency and its effect on rivals).
157. See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 152, at 94 (explaining
consumer value of network).
158. See id. at 106 (explaining consumer value placed on technology and net-
work size in relation to dominant and rival systems).
159. See id. (discussing how consumer heterogeneity and product differentia-
tion limit "tipping" while sustaining multiple networks). Tipping occurs when one
system pulls away from its rivals in popularity after gaining an initial edge. See id.
160. See id. (mentioning that if rival systems have distinct features, two or
more systems may be able to survive by catering to consumers who care more
about product attributes than network size).
161. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUS-
TRIAL CAPITALISM 17 (1990) (defining economies of scale as "those that result when
the increased size of a single operating unit producing or distributing a single
product reduces the unit cost of production or distribution"); Douglas Gagax &
Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Utility Industry: An Evaluation, 10 YALE
J. ON REG. 63,,67 (1993) (explaining that natural monopoly arises when single firm
can produce desired level of output at lower cost than any output combinations for
more than one firm).
162. See Baseman et al., supra note 15, at 270 (stating that for operating sys-
tems "fixed costs are enormous and marginal costs are negligible"); Gifford,
Microsoft Corporation, supra note 33, at 639-40 (discussing scale economies and mon-
itoring costs).
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inant, because as volume increases, unit cost decreases, but at a declining
rate. 163 As a result, the potential customer base for operating systems is
probably large enough to support a number of them.
Thus, both network effects and scale economies contribute to the sup-
port of a dominant operating system. When a system becomes sufficiently
dominant as to become a de facto industry standard, positive social welfare
benefits are generated. Network effects theory can be used to describe
how an industry standard facilitates interaction among users of the system
and the development of applications systems at low cost. 16 4 Scale econo-
mies help society to produce the standard system while economizing on
resources.
1 65
B. Historical Events Contributing to Microsoft's Dominance Over
Operating Systems
Network externalities explains the value of a network in settings in
which the use of the network by others enhances each user's welfare.' 6 6
When employed in connection with path dependency theory, it can ex-
plain how an inferior technology can achieve a dominant position in a
market characterized by network effects. 167 Indeed, an initial lead time-
which results from accidents or other trivial events-could confer an ad-
vantage on the winning technology. 168 Network effects may enhance that
early advantage so that rival technologies never pose a serious threat of
displacing the leader. It is also true, however, that the lead held by the
dominant technology may be the result, in part, of technical superiority,
better marketing or both. In the case of Microsoft, there are reasons to
163. As a fixed cost is allocated among increasing units of output, unit cost
necessarily declines. The reduction in unit cost, however, grows smaller as volume
increases.
164. SeeJohn E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Posner's Program for the Antitrust
Division: A Twenty Five Year Perspective, 48 SMU L. REv. 1713, 1739 (1995) [herein-
after Lopatka & Page, Posner's Program] (explaining how unregulated markets can
fail because of incompatible standards); see also Mark A. Lemley & David Mc-
Gowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479, 497 (1998)
[hereinafter Lemley & McGowan, Legal Implications] (explaining how single stan-
dard may promote efficiency in some markets).
165. See CHANDLER, supra note 161, at 17 (discussing benefits of economies of
scale).
166. See Lopatka & Page, Posner's Program, supra note 164, at 1738-39 (describ-
ing network externalities and explaining how complementary goods become more
plentiful and lower in price as number of users for goods increases). See generally
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility,
75 AM. ECON. REv. 424 (1985) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities]
(discussing network effects and implications for antitrust).
167. See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 152, at 135 (defining network effect
as "circumstance in which net value of an action . . .is affected by number of
agents taking equivalent actions").
168. SeeW. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE
ECONOMY 19, 24 (1994).
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believe that its succeess is causally connected to the combination of prod-
uct quality and superior marketing.1
69
Microsoft became the producer of the dominant personal computer
operating system when it undercut the prices charged by producers of ri-
val operating systems for the original IBM personal computer. 170 When
the IBM personal computer was cloned, Microsoft furnished its operating
system (MS-DOS) to the clone producers, continuing its dominance. 17 1
During the next decade and a half, Microsoft released several improved
versions of MS-DOS. 172 Because each of the upgrades ran applications
designed for earlier versions of MS-DOS, Microsoft retained its leadership
over operating systems. 173 After Apple introduced a graphical user inter-
face in its unsuccessful Lisa and later in its successful Macintosh, Microsoft
released its Windows graphical user interface in 1990 and 1991 as an over-
lay for MS-DOS. 174 In Windows, Microsoft again provided an operating
169. See, e.g., Tracy E. Benson, Beyond Niche Marketing, INDUSTRY WK., Sept. 17,
1990, at 12, 12-14 (discussing Microsoft's outstanding marketing efforts); Lopatka
& Page, Antitrust Decision Making, supra note 35, at 329 (noting that "story of
Microsoft's success is well-known"); Susan Yeaton, Powerful Presentations for Windows,
BYTx, Jan. 1995, at 183, 183-84 (noting that Microsoft's Powerpoint was best overall
product).
170. See BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 49 (1995) (describing pricing of oper-
ating systems for original IBM personal computer).
171. See generally BradleyJohnson, Low End Clones Flourish, Spurred by Recession:
Niche Marketing May be the Answer for Top PC Brands, ADVER. AGE, Apr. 27, 1992, at
37, 37 (discussing IBM's loss of market share to clones because of Intel and
Microsoft's marketing to clone-producers). The spread of clones, all using the
Microsoft operating system, provided a large installed base attracting software de-
velopers to the Microsoft/Intel platform. Apple's decision not to license produc-
tion of the Macintosh contributed to the smaller base of these machines and thus
to their reduced attractiveness to software developers. See Gifford, Microsoft Corpo-
ration, supra note 33, at 650 (explaining how Microsoft's marketing plan provided
individuals with higher quality, lower priced operating systems).
172. See Brian Livingston, MS-DOS 5.0-A Real Improvement? SYS. INTEGRATION,
Aug. 1991, at 40-42 (noting that MS-DOS series of upgrades are useful, but
problems still exist); see also Tim Clark, Early Returns Strong for 2 Microsoft Campaigns,
Bus. MARKETING, May 1993, at 12, 12 (noting that more copies of MS-DOS 6.0 were
sold in first two weeks than all of DOS 5.0 and Windows 3.1 combined).
173. See Michael D. Millikin, Microsoft's Forecast: Hot and Sunny, DATA COMM.,
Mar. 1992, at 35, 35 (noting Microsoft's enhancement of products and rating as
top vendor).
174. See generally GATES, supra note 170, at 53-54 (discussing release of graphi-
cal interface); Doug Harper, The PC Graphical User Interface Arrives: Microsoft Win-
dows Proves There's Life in DOS Yet, INDUS. DISTRIBUTION, Oct. 1990, at 61, 61
(discussing how graphical interface revitalizes MS-DOS, is user friendly and im-
proves memory management). To develop its graphic user interface, Microsoft
employed technology that was licensed in a significant amount from Apple. See
MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 84, at 291-93.
Microsoft released Windows 3.1 in April 1991. Windows 3.1 was a significant
enhancement of Windows 3.0, which had been released some time before. See
Baseman et al., supra note 15, at 265 (chronicling development of Windows); see
also Lopatka & Page, Antitrust Decision Making, supra note 35, at 322 (discussing
development of Windows, which "added to MS-DOS a graphical user interface
[Vol. 44: p. 67
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device that proved extremely popular. At the time Microsoft offered Win-
dows, a number of rival user interfaces were being offered by competitors,
but Windows won out in the market. 175
The success of both MS-DOS and Windows can be described in terms
of network externalities and path dependency theory. Initial success fed
upon itself, as applications producers wrote applications for the Microsoft
products, thus enhancing the value of the underlying MS-DOS and Win-
dows programs and in turn further stimulating applications producers to
produce applications compatible with MS-DOS and Windows.
In the 1990s, the personal computer industry faced the transition
from 16-bit to 32-bit architecture.1 7 6 In 1992, IBM and Microsoft, which
had been jointly developing an operating system (OS2) to replace MS-
DOS, abandoned their joint efforts. IBM then introduced its OS2 2.0, a
32-bit system, in 1992.177 Subsequently, Microsoft introduced its own 32-
bit operating system, Windows NT. 178 Later, in 1994, IBM released its
OS2 Warp, a revised and improved version of OS2 and also-like OS2
2.0-a 32-bit system. 179 Windows NT was not compatible with the 16-bit
applications programs written for MS-DOS and its Windows overlays (such
as Windows 3.1).180 Partially because of this backward incompatibility,
Windows NT did not attract many users in the nonbusiness sector. While
OS2 Warp was backwardly compatible, its need for 16 megabytes of RAM
discouraged its use at the time of its introduction in the Fall of 1994 be-
cause personal computers then did not routinely carry that amount of
RAM. 18 1
(GIU) and ability to execute more than one application simultaneously," which is
known as multitasking).
175. IBM was then offering its "Topview," a character-based windows and mul-
titasking system. See MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 84, at 266-67; see also Albert J.
Enzweiler, The Windows Interface Takes Over, MGMT. Acr., Dec. 1995, at 54, 54-55
(noting that desire to work in windows has spread beyond spreadsheets and that all
top 45 software vendors have Windows-based ledgers); Windows Pain: Computer
Software, THE ECONOMIST, May 8, 1993, at 72, 72 (discussing Windows' market
domination).
176. See Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, supra note 33, at 650 (noting that
Microsoft is leading transition from 16-bit to 32-bit architecture).
177. See Lopatka & Page, Antitrust Decision Making, supra note 35, at 322 (dis-
cussing development of OS/2 and OS/2 Warp); see also Laurie Hayes & Michael
Wofsey, IBM's 0S2/2.1 Debut Is Modest Success But Launch of Rival Windows NT Looms,
WALL ST. J., July 2, 1993, at B2 (discussing debut of OS/2 and impending release
of Windows NT).
178. See Hayes & Wofsey, supra note 177, at B2 (discussing release of Windows
NT).
179. SeeAlan S. Kay, Where WARP Fits, DATAMATiON, Oct. 15, 1995, at 75, 75-77;
Lopatka & Page, Antitrust Decision Making, supra note 35, at 322 (discussing release
of OS/2 Warp as marketing alternative to Windows).
180. See generally, White Paper-Microsoft Corp., COMPUTER RESELLER NEWS,
Sept. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13698173 (discussing how Windows NT is not
compatible with 16-bit applications).
181. SeeKay, supra note 179, at 75-77 (discussing OS/2);John McMullen, OS/
2's Second Coming, DATAMATION, Apr. 15, 1991, at 49, 49-50 (discussing 32-bit ver-
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Microsoft successfully managed a transition from the 16-bit system to
a 32-bit system with Windows 95. Windows 95 and its successor, Windows
98, run 32-bit programs and are backwardly compatible with the 16-bit
applications written for MS-DOS and Windows 3.1.182 By the Summer of
1995, when Windows 95 was introduced, most computers were being mar-
keted with at least eight megabytes of RAM, an amount that was sufficient
for Windows 95.l83 Thus, contrary to IBM, Microsoft keyed the design of
its new product to the capabilities of the prevailing hardware.184
Unquestionably, network effects made a major contribution to
Microsoft's success. They appear, however, to account for only a part of
that success. The combination of technology geared to meet the needs
and desires of consumers with astute marketing also must be taken into
account in any assessment of how Microsoft achieved its present position.
Microsoft's present dominance in operating systems does not appear to be
explainable as the result of one or more trivial events, as in the stereotype
often referred to in the network externalities literature.
1 85
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY- THE GOVERNMENT CASE
AND THE JAVA PLATFORM PARADIGM
The Government, Netscape and Sun share a vision of a likely future
for the computer software industry. In that future, internet servers will
provide software to consumers, with the internet connection serving as the
link between the application on the server and the user's home termi-
nal.18 6 The Java platform paradigm, identified in the Government's com-
plaint in the current suit (and inter alia, in its memorandum in support of
its contempt petition), is indeed one version of this future. It is not, how-
ever, the only possible version. The Government's challenge to
Microsoft's marketing of its browser raises the question of how society will
choose among alternative technologies. Although the Government has
pointed to the Java platform paradigm as a possible future for the com-
sion of OS/2); Stanley Zarowin, How to Pick the Perfect PC (For You), J. Accr., Mar.
1995, at 65, 66 (discussing available hardware configurations).
182. See Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, supra note 33, at 651 (discussing back-
ward compatibility of Windows 32-bit system); Howard Millman, Windows 95 Head-
aches Start Bit by Bit: 32-Bit Applications Are Worth the Wait, COMPUTERwORLD, Aug.
21, 1995, at 37, 37 (discussing virtues of Windows 95).
183. See Zarowin, supra note 181, at 66 (discussing hardware configurations
available in 1995).
184. For a general discussion of Microsoft's technological developments, see
Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, supra note 33, at 624-28.
185. See, e.g., Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 152, at 94 (discuss-
ing network effects and network externalities); Lopatka & Page, Posner's Program,
supra note 164, at 1738 (explaining network externalities).
186. See Amy Cortese et al., The Software Revolution, Bus. WK., Dec. 4, 1995, at
78, 78 (describing software distribution through servers); see also Sun Microsystems,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1301, 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (explaining that
Java technology gives software developers ability to create programming code capa-
ble of operating on many different, otherwise incompatible, system platforms).
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puter software industry, the Government is advancing that paradigm cau-
tiously. Its attack is cast as a challenge to a tying arrangement (that is also
cast as monopolization and attempted monopolization)-the tie consists
of the bundling by Microsoft of its browser with its operating system.
187
The challenge to the tie, however, has a much larger goal than the mere
unbundling of the browser. It is designed to advance the likelihood that
the Java platform paradigm replaces the Windows platform and thus ends
Microsoft's dominance over operating systems.
In the Government's view, the question is whether Microsoft will be
permitted to leverage its Windows monopoly into a monopoly over in-
ternet access. 1 88 Before addressing the Government's primary theory, let
us look first at the Government's tying theory.
A. Tying the Browser to the Operating System
The Government has placed enormous weight upon its contention
that Microsoft engaged in tying. Yet the tie employed by Microsoft is vastly
different from conventional tying arrangements. 1 89 In the classic tie, the
187. See generally Complaint, supra note 1, 103-23, 134-37, 138-41.
188. See id. 13, 19 (alleging that Microsoft is using its power over operating
systems to capture browser market); Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2 (arguing
that Microsoft should be prevented from using "its monopoly power in operating
systems to gain an unlawful advantage that could protect or extend its monopoly
and inhibit competition"). See generally Thomas A. Piraino, An Antitrust Remedy or
Monopoly Leveraging by Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1998) (describing
monopoly over internet access).
189. See Memorandum, supra note 12, at 12-15 (describing various aspects of
Microsoft's tie-in arrangement between Internet Explorer and Windows 95). The
controversy in the Microsoft antitrust case over the degree to which the Internet
Explorer is a stand alone product or is integrated into the Windows operating
system is diverting public attention away from the extent to which browsers and the
operating system are coalescing together. See Halfhill, Good-Bye, supra note 70, at
60 (discussing trend of new products that will "integrate" web browsers and operat-
ing systems so that difference between them will be almost imperceptible to users).
In the contempt proceedings before the district court, the parties were discussing
the integration issue in terms of the extent to which the browser can be disabled
without harm to the operating system. See id. (discussing numerous new products
that will "blur the already increasingly irrelevant distinctions between native/cross-
platform and local/remote applications"); see also Ronald S. Katz & Janet Arnold
Hart, Sideshow: U.S. v. Microsoft, SC71 ALI-ABA 1, 6 (1998) ("A large portion of
both the Government's and Microsoft's briefs were taken up with argument as to
what constituted an 'integrated' product and what constituted a 'separate' product
for purposes of the consent decree."). That question, however, involves only part
of this broad convergence.
Both Microsoft and Netscape are responding to the perception that the public
is increasingly demanding convergence. See Halfhill, Good-Bye, supra note 70, at 63
(characterizing trend towards web browser-operating system integration as "ava-
lanche signif[ying] a major trend"). The new Netscape Constellation inserts a
shell around the Windows operating system so that the user stays within a single
environment whether operating with material on the internet, intranets or in the
user's own files on his or her personal computer. See id. at 66 (describing Netscape
Constellation). In this case, the environment is the browser environment provided
by Netscape. See id. Microsoft's Internet Explorer also provides a single environ-
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seller reallocates some monopoly rents from the tying product to the tied
product. Sellers often employ ties to facilitate price discrimination. Thus,
in IBM v. United States,190 involving early "computing machines" and
punched cards, IBM leased its machines at a low lease rate and charged
monopoly rates for the cards.19 1 By so doing, it charged high prices to
high-intensity users (for whom the value of computing was high) and low
prices to low-intensity users (for whom the value of computing was
lower). 192 The cards were, in effect, a metering device used to facilitate
charging customers sums that varied with their use of the machines. Pric-
ing by use is a common practice. Copying machines are commonly leased
today under a lease arrangement that keys the rent to the usage of the
machine. Although today's auto rental companies are moving away from
the practice, in the past they commonly based their charges on miles
driven. It is not apparent that metering charges generally produce an-
ticompetitive effects. 19 3
Metering or other forms of price discrimination may be objectiona-
ble, however, when carried out by a monopolist. Indeed, one of the
grounds traditionally urged in support of the condemnation of tying ar-
rangements has been their amenability to being used by a monopolist to
discriminate in price. The metering charge involved in the IBM case
could be visualized as price discrimination-a higher charge leveled
against users with a higher demand than the charge leveled against users
with a lower demand. Because IBM was the only producer of electronic
ment through its Active Desktop optional interface. See id. at 64-66 (describing
Microsoft's Internet Explorer and Active Desktop software). While the effect is
visually similar to Netscape's, Microsoft integrates the browser into the operating
system rather than riding upon it, as in the Netscape version. See id. Sun Microsys-
tems has integrated its browser into its operating system, apparently so thoroughly
that the browser must be used to install the operating system. See Steve Hamm et
al., Does Everyone Do It?, Bus. WK., Nov. 2, 1998, at 30, 30-31 (noting integration of
operating system into single environment). When current developments in
software are seen in the light of this new paradigm of a single user environment,
these developments are better understood. Thus-contrary to the way the issue
was presented in the contempt proceeding before the district court-the integra-
tion is not measured by the ability of the operating system to perform its standard
functions when the browser is removed. Rather, the "integration" describes an
improved browser/Windows-user interface, heightening the ability of Windows-
users to access external material without leaving their normal operating
environment.
190. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
191. See id. at 136 (describing IBM's leasing arrangements); see also ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 377 (1978) (using facts of IBM to describe variable
proportion price discrimination).
192. See BORK, supra note 191, at 377 (describing variable proportion price
discrimination).
193. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67
YALE L.J. 19, 23-24 (1957) (explaining why metering methods do not lead to new
monopolies over tied products).
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calculating machines at the time, that objection literally applied.1 94 Ob-
servers, however, have pointed out that the more a monopolist employs
price discrimination to charge each customer its reservation price (i.e., the
highest price that customer is willing to pay), the less the monopolist mis-
allocates society's resources. 195 In fact, in the case of a perfectly discrimi-
nating monopolist, there is no restriction on output and no misallocation
of resources.19 6 If, as the Chicago School argues, efficiency is the sole goal
of antitrust law, then the price discrimination carried out by a perfectly
discriminating monopolist is consistent with that goal. 197 Outlawing
IBM's attempt to replicate the behavior of a perfectly discriminating mo-
nopolist would engender incentives for it to behave as a single price mo-
nopolist, behavior that would produce the classic monopoly effect of
misallocating resources.' 9 8 In her concurring opinion in Jefferson Parish
Hospital District Number 2 v. Hyde,199 Justice O'Connor showed her aware-
ness of the possibility that price discrimination might "decrease rather than
increase the economic costs of a seller's market power." 200 While she
urged the abandonment of the per se rule against tying, she expressly
avoided addressing the problem of price discrimination. 20 1 A majority of
the Court, however, may still agree with Justice Stevens that an evil of tying
194. See IBM, 298 U.S. at 133. Remington Rand, Inc. also produced comput-
ing machines, but its machines were mechanically operated rather than electrically
operated. See id.
195. See BORK, supra note 191, at 398 (asserting that "when the monopoly in-
volved is lawful, the more the monopolist is permitted to discriminate, the better
are the results in terms of resource allocation").
196. See id. (observing that discriminating monopolist would produce same
output as competitive industries). It is possible, however, for a monopolist to dis-
criminate and to reduce aggregate output beyond the output restriction associated
with a single monopoly price, thereby exacerbating the misallocation of resources.
See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAw AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTE-
GRATION AND CONTROL 124 (1983) (asserting that price discrimination may con-
tract as well as expand output).
197. See BoRK, supra note 191, at 398 (noting that output of perfectly discrimi-
nating monopolist is same as output in competitive market). Although the Chi-
cago School has been ascendant for several decades, some antitrust observers,
while conceding that efficiency is a major goal of antitrust, deny that it is the sole
or exclusive goal. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Competitiveness, and the World
Arena: Efficiencies and Failing Firms in Perspective, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 725, 730 (1996)
(claiming that "efficiency, as opposed to competition, is not the raison d'etre of
antitrust law"); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern
of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 89-90 (1982)
(propounding distributional standard for antitrust analysis).
198. See BORK, supra note 191, at 397-98 (describing possible adverse eco-
nomic effects of prohibiting sellers from practicing price discrimination).
199. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
200. Id. at 36 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing in favor of focusing on ad-
verse and beneficial economic effects of tying instead of per se prohibition on
tying, yet declining to address price discrimination facilitated by tying).
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lies in its ability to facilitate price discrimination. 20 2 Under the classic
view-reflected injustice Stevens's opinion in Jefferson Parish-a seller may
exploit its monopoly by charging monopoly prices for the product over
which it possesses a monopoly, but it may not shift monopoly rents from
the tying product onto the tied product.20 3 To do so "extends" its monop-
oly unlawfully, and the resulting tie forecloses rival sellers from the market
for the tied product. 2
0 4
Finally, the per se rule against tying arrangements has also been justi-
fied as a means for ensuring that the seller will not use a monopoly posi-
tion in the tying product to gain a new monopoly in the market for the
tied product.20 This would involve the seller "leveraging" its power in the
market for the tying product to generate a monopoly in the tied product
market.20 6 There are few places, however, where such leveraging could
occur. If there is a fixed proportional relationship between the two prod-
ucts, it is likely that a correct analysis would conclude that in fact only one
product is actually involved. 20 7 Indeed, normally in a case of fixed propor-
tions no additional monopoly power can be acquired by the seller through
tying.208 In many cases in which there is a variable proportion between
the two products, the seller is trying to discriminate in price rather than to
"monopolize" a second product. 20 9
The current antitrust litigation does not fit especially well with the
traditional reasons for condemning tying arrangements. 210 In this case,
202. See id. at 14-15 (asserting that tying impairs competition and facilitates
price discrimination, thereby increasing monopoly profits).
203. See id. at 14 (stating that law draws distinctions between use of market
power to charge monopoly prices for tying product, which is permitted, and use of
market power over tying product to charge monopoly prices over tied product,
which is prohibited).
204. See id. (asserting that tie could create barriers for new competitors' entry
into market for tied products).
205. This argument was common in the 1950s, when hostility towards tying
arrangements was at its height. See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST
POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 157 (1959) (advocating subjecting tie-
ins to per se rule because "[a] tie-in always operates to raise the barriers to entry in
the market of the tied good to the level of those in the market for the tying good:
the seller who would supply the one, can do so only if he can also supply the
other").
206. See id. (describing how sellers use power in market for tying good to gain
competitive advantage).
207. See Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust
Laws, 72 HARv. L. REv. 50, 72 (1958) ("The sale of items used in fixed proportions
might be deemed prima facie the sale of a single product .... ).
208. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 370-72 (1994) (ex-
plaining problems with leverage theory); Bowman, supra note 193, at 23 (observing
that fixed proportions do not necessarily create monopoly).
209. For a further discussion of the use of tying as a means to discriminate in
price, rather than to chill competition, see supra notes 189-208 and accompanying
text.
210. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997)
(struggling with application of tying doctrine), rev'd, 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
[Vol. 44: p. 67
34
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss1/2
JAVA AND MICROSOFT
there does not appear to be any price discrimination. 21 1 Therefore, con-
cern about price discrimination cannot underlie the Government's en-
forcement action. Microsoft has been giving the browser away; it is not
shifting any monopoly rents on to the browsers. Thus, contrary to IBM,
there is no price discrimination. The Government, however, is casting its
tying charge in the language of foreclosure and leveraging.21 2 These are
indeed terms that traditional tying has repeatedly employed. Yet in the
Microsoft context, these terms must be employed with care.
The Government sees Microsoft "foreclosing" Netscape and other po-
tential browser sellers from the browser market.2 1 3 Its current complaint
repeatedly refers to this foreclosure.2 1 4 Yet under the traditional foreclo-
sure analysis, foreclosure is part of a scheme to shift rents to the tied prod-
uct, a scheme that is not present here. The Government complains both
that Microsoft has given away its browser and that it is tied to the operating
system.2 15 These practices have foreclosed Netscape from selling its prod-
uct, thus depriving it of substantial revenues. But Netscape was also giving
its product away. 2 16 These circumstances provide an unusual context in
which to apply traditional tying doctrine. That doctrine fits uneasily into a
framework in which both major players have, at one time or another, en-
gaged in the practice of giving away their products. Giving the product
away freely is not tying. Is bundling different from giving the product
away freely? Perhaps, but the difference needs to be explained.
It is a version of the leveraging objection, however, that really under-
lies the Government's concern about tying in the current antitrust case.
Indeed, it was that same version of leveraging that underlay the Govern-
ment's contempt proceeding.21 7 But it did not fit the circumstances of
the contempt proceeding very well. First, in the contempt proceeding, the
Government was only challenging Microsoft's bundling of its browser with
Windows 95, a bundling that has been superceded by Microsoft's full inte-
211. Because Microsoft is not charging separately for the browser, there is no
price discrimination. For a further discussion of the practice of giving browsers
away, see supra notes 112-25 and accompanying text.
212. See Complaint, supra note 1, 9 12, 18, 22, 75, 97, 103 (h), 111, 123, 127,
137. A leading critic of Chicago-School leveraging analysis is Professor Louis
Kaplow. See Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 515, 515 (1985) (discussing practice of tying in conjunction with
leveraging).
213. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 1, 1 103(R) (alleging effort by Microsoft
"to foreclose opportunities for non-Microsoft browsers to establish themselves").
214. See id. 22, 111, 123, 127, 137 (alleging foreclosure).
215. See id. 1 16, 22, 23, 103, 108, 109-12, 115-21, 127, 135-41 (alleging tie
and failure to impose separate charge).
216. For a discussion of the practice of competitors giving away browsers, see
supra notes 112-25 and accompanying text.
217. See Memorandum, supra note 12, at 29; see also Daniel L. Rubenfeld, Anti-
trust Enforcement at DOJ: An Economist's Perspective, Address Before The Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York (Nov. 17, 1997), available in 1997 WL
792881.
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gration of the browser and the operating system in Windows 98. It thus
appears implausible to argue that the temporary bundling of the browser
with Windows 95 between the district court's order of December 1997 and
May 1998 (when Windows 98 was released) could generate a monopoly for
Microsoft over internet browsers. Second, there are numerous problem-
atic aspects of its tying case under the traditional doctrinal analysis applica-
ble to tying arrangements. 2 18
These problematic aspects of the contempt proceeding may have
been rendered effectively moot by the new antitrust case. In the new suit,
the Government is attacking ties of the browser to both Windows 95 and
Windows 98 and contending that these ties are designed to help Microsoft
acquire a monopoly in the browser market.2 19 Even here, however, the
claim that Microsoft is attempting to acquire a monopoly over the browser
market is an odd claim, given that browsers are being given away. If
Microsoft is tying the browser to the operating system by selling the two as
one product, how is it increasing its profits by doing so?
The Government, however, does not object to the tie for completely
traditional reasons. 220 The Government's objection is about leveraging,
but it is a peculiar form of leveraging that makes use of the relatively new
concepts of network effects and path dependency theory. 221 Even without
these new theories, a leveraging case might exist when the users of the
tying product are the principal customers for the tied product and the
products are not purchased in a fixed proportion. 22 2 Such a circumstance
would be an unusual one, but that relationship may exist between users of
operating systems and customers for browsers. The Government seems to
be identifying the bundle of the browser with the operating system as an
arrangement that fits this profile and then has added to its formulation a
time dimension along with the network and path dependency analyses.
The Government, under this approach, objects to the tie, viewing it as
a device by which Microsoft utilizes the network effects phenomenon to
218. For a discussion of traditional tying cases, see infra notes 225, 226, 232
and accompanying text.
219. See Complaint, supra note 1, 1 103-12 (alleging Windows 95 tie); id.
113-23 (alleging Windows 98 tie).
220. For a further discussion of the Government's basis for objecting to the
tie between the Explorer and Microsoft servers, see supra note 71 and accompany-
ing text.
221. There is ground for believing that the Government's tying claim is, at
base, one of temporal tying. For a discussion of temporal tying, see infra notes 223-
24 and accompanying text. See Memorandum, supra note 12, at 13-39 (detailing
Government's leveraging charges against Microsoft).
222. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 173
(1976) ("It is only when the users of the tying product are also the principal cus-
tomers for the tied product-by no means the typical tie-in case-that tying can
rightly be described as a method of obtaining a second monopoly."). Although
Posner then questions why a firm would want to obtain a monopoly on a comple-
mentary good, he does not deal with the circumstance in which a second monop-
oly replaces an eroding monopoly. See id.
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establish its dominance over internet technology. 223 Here, the tie pro-
duces its effects temporally, rather than in the static market employed in
the traditional analysis.224 The Government's case is therefore a combina-
tion of the doctrinal with newly emerging economic theory.
But even in a temporal analysis, we have to consider the "power" of
the seller of the tying product to coerce consumers to take an unwanted
product in substitution for a desired product.22 5 Here, there are some
more troublesome aspects of the Government's argument. The imposi-
tion of a tie requires that a buyer be "forced" or coerced to take a product
that it does not want.22 6 The tie appears to be Microsoft's insistence that
computer manufacturers who choose to install its operating system also
install its browser. 227 There are grounds for believing that Microsoft does
not object to a manufacturer adding the Netscape or other browser so
long as Microsoft's browser is also included.228 If this is the case, then it is
difficult to see how there could have been even a technical tie.
In addressing the issue of tying, the courts have failed to define ade-
quately the full scope of behavior that can constitute a tying arrange-
ment.229 Congress, however, has defined tying arrangements in section 3
of the Clayton Act 23 0 by focusing on foreclosure. 23 ' Surely this definition
should be persuasive in determining what constitutes a tie for purposes of
223. See Complaint, supra note 1, 127. For a discussion of network effects as
applied to Microsoft, see Lemley & McGowan, Legal Implications, supra note 164, at
500-07 (discussing effects of forced integration under network effects
phenomenon).
224. See Lemley & McGowan, Competitive Propriety, supra note 12, at 733-50
(discussing "temporal tying").
225. See IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936) (observing that
other cards of equal or better quality may be offered at same or lower prices).
226. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32 (1984). In
Jefferson Parish, the Court stated:
[T] he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the
seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the
buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not
want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different
terms. When such "forcing" is present, competition on the merits in the
market for the tied item is restrained and the Sherman Act is violated.
Id. at 12.
227. See Complaint, supra note 1, 11 103-23 (alleging unlawful tying of
browser to Windows 95 and 98 operating systems); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 945-53 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (considering tying issue in contempt
proceeding).
228. See generally Senate Hearing, supra note 10 (noting testimony of Bill Gates).
229. See Daniel J. Gifford, The Damaging Impact of the Eastman Kodak Precedent
Upon Product Competition: Antitrust Law in Need of Correction, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1507,
1510-11 & nn. 7, 8 (1994) [hereinafter Gifford, Damaging Impact] (discussing
Supreme Court's lack of clarity in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,
504 U.S. 451 (1992)).
230. 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994).
231. Section 3 prohibits tying that may "substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." Id.
37
Gifford: Java and Microsoft: How Does the Antitrust Story Unfold
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the Sherman Act as well. The Sherman Act cases, as well as the Clayton
Act cases, reflect a similar concern with foreclosure. 232 In the new anti-
trust case, the Government has made numerous assertions that Microsoft's
tying practices were foreclosing the browser market to Netscape and
others. 233 But so long as Microsoft allows computer manufacturers to in-
stall non-Microsoft browsers in addition to the Explorer, it is difficult to
identify foreclosure. The manufacturer is free to install whatever addi-
tional browser it wishes, and when the manufacturer installs an additional
browser consumers will have the ultimate choice as to which browser to
use.23 4 Thus, the foreclosure analysis associated with traditional tying doc-
trine does not quite fit in this case.
In the traditional tie, the purchaser is prevented from acquiring the
tied product from an alternative source because the purchaser has already
paid the tying seller for the tied product. To acquire the tied product
from an independent source would require the purchaser to pay for its
supplies twice. That kind of effect inhered in the lump-sum licenses that
Microsoft had entered into with computer manufacturers prior to the con-
sent decree. 235 Having paid a lump-sum for a license to install as many
Windows operating systems as it needs, the computer manufacturer is posi-
tively discouraged from seeking a license from an alternative supplier of
operating systems. To do so would require the manufacturer to pay
twice. 23 6 In the browser market, however, this is not the case. The com-
puter manufacturer who is furnished a free copy of the Explorer may still
acquire an alternative browser (such as the Navigator) at no greater cost
than it would incur had it purchased the Navigator in the absence of the
bundle. Indeed, now that Netscape is giving away its browser, computer
manufacturers can add its browser to their products without cost. There is
no obvious foreclosure here.
232. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 478 (viewing "market foreclosure"
as facially anticompetitive in context of tying claim); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (observing that tying arrangements "deny competitors
free access to the market for tied product" and force buyers to forego their free
choice between competing products).
233. See Complaint, supra note 1, 23, 103(h), 111, 123, 127, 137.
234. Of course, in the case described, Microsoft has arguably affected the
choice of the computer manufacturer. In the absence of the bundling, the manu-
facturer might have decided to install only the Netscape Navigator. Even so, it is
hard to identify foreclosure so long as the manufacturer remains free also to install
the Navigator. It may be said that the manufacturer will not install both the Navi-
gator and the Explorer and once it is required to take the Explorer, it will no
longer want the Navigator. Perhaps. But why not? If a computer manufacturer
believes that their customers prefer the Navigator, an economically rational com-
puter manufacturer would install the Navigator. Cf id. (finding that superior
browser will ultimately win).
235. See Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, supra note 33, at 632-33 (describing ob-
jectionable features of lump-sum licenses).
236. See id. (discussing double payment consequences inherent in lump-sum
license); see also Baseman et al., supra note 15, at 281-82 (discussing increased costs
associated with lump-sum licenses).
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Perhaps, however, there is an indirect foreclosure as a result of addi-
tional costs that computer manufacturers would incur in installing a sec-
ond browser-computer manufacturers might decide that they want only
one browser on the machines they produce because installing two brows-
ers would increase their costs for technical support. Perhaps. It is the
number of computer purchasers using browsers, however, that seems to
constitute the relevant datum for purposes of technical support. Most
users probably stick with a single browser. It does not appear likely, there-
fore, that the installation of additional browsers would generate a surfeit
of additional calls for technical help. If the costs of installing an addi-
tional browser are in fact minimal, this indirect foreclosure becomes less
easy to identify.
Not only is it difficult to see foreclosure in the bundling, it is similarly
difficult to see the difference between Microsoft's bundling the browser
with its operating system and its giving away the browser to anyone who
wants it. In both cases, the browser is provided free-of-charge. Indeed,
during the period that the district court had enjoined Microsoft from bun-
dling the browser with the operating system, these alternatives coalesced.
Microsoft complied with the injunction by offering computer manufactur-
ers the option of taking the Windows 95 operating system with an opera-
tive browser or of disabling it.23 7 That choice was effectively whether to
accept a free browser or to reject it. So long as Netscape was charging a
fee for the browser, Microsoft's free offer was probably especially difficult
to refuse, at least if-and to the extent that-the Microsoft browser is
qualitatively comparable to the Netscape browser.
If Microsoft had not only required computer manufacturers to in-
clude its browsers on their machines, but also required them to exclude
the Netscape Navigator, then the preceding analysis would not apply.
Under these circumstances, a plausible case of forcing would be stated and
the Government would have a valid basis for demanding an end to this
exclusionary practice. Yet in the contempt proceeding, the injunction was
cast in terms of ordering Microsoft to cease bundling, rather than in terms
of ordering Microsoft to refrain from prohibiting the installation of rival
browsers on newly manufactured computers. 238 This was an odd phrasing
if the exclusionary behavior consisted of an insistence that rival browsers
be barred from new Windows-licensed machines. If Microsoft had insisted
only on bundling, but did not object to manufacturers adding other
browsers to their machines, then there was no obvious exclusion and the
injunction itself requires justification-a justification not found in (or
with) the court's order.23 9
237. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 940-41 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (discussing injunction).
238. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537, 545 (D.D.C.
1997), rev'd, 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
239. See Daniel J. Gifford, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. REv. 1677,
1711-12 (1995) [hereinafter Gifford, Antitrust] (arguing for concerted efforts by
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In the antitrust suit, the Government takes the view that Microsoft
may bundle the browser with its operating system, but subject to two major
conditions. First, the Government wants computer manufacturers to be
able to delete the Microsoft browser and to be compensated for any costs
incurred in the deletion.2 40 Second, for three years a Microsoft integrated
operating-system/browser bundle must include the rival Netscape browser
and computer manufacturers must be given the option of deleting the
Microsoft browser if they so desire.24 1 The Government's primary focus
thus appears to be on enabling computer manufacturers to delete the
Microsoft browser. But the Government's acceptance of bundling, pro-
vided that the Netscape browser is included in the bundle, transforms a
related aspect of its position from hostility to bundling to an acceptance of
bundling, so long as the bundling does not foreclose. If in fact the present
licensing system does not preclude computer manufacturers from adding
additional browsers, the difference between that aspect of the relief
sought and the present practice is narrow. Under present practice, the
computer manufacturer lacks the option of deleting the Microsoft browser
and it is at least an open question as to whether a computer manufacturer
is discouraged from adding a second browser by the prospect of incurring
additional support or other costs.
The bundling analysis, however, can be rendered moot by another
aspect of traditional tying doctrine-the requirement that there be two
products, a tying product and a tied product. The question of whether
one or two products is involved has been a bane of the tying aspect of
antitrust for decades. Over forty years ago in one of the foundation cases
of tying law, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,24 2 the Govern-
ment floundered on this requirement.2 43 In that case, the Government
contended that the defendant newspaper publisher had been tying adver-
tising in its morning newspaper to advertising in its evening paper.244 The
Government lost, however, as the Supreme Court ruled that advertising in
the two papers constituted a single product. 245
enforcement authorities and courts to advance coherence as antitrust goal). This
particular phrasing of the injunction carries the potential for weakening public
confidence in enforcement institutions. If the Government and the court believe
that the bundling of a free item forecloses, both institutions should explain their
reasoning.
240. See Complaint, supra note 1, at Part VIII, 1 (f) (requesting decree provi-
sion enabling computer manufacturers to delete Explorer icon and to disable
Explorer).
241. See id. 1(e) (requesting decree provision requiring bundling of Net-
scape browser whenever Explorer is bundled).
242. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
243. See id. at 614 ("[T]wo newspapers under single ownership at the same
place, time, and terms sell indistinguishable products to advertisers; [and there-
fore] no dominant 'tying' product exists .....
244. See id. at 600.
245. See id. at 613.
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A peculiarly difficult form of this issue involves the integration of pre-
viously separate items into a new single product. During the 1970s, the
lawfulness of IBM's integration of previously separate peripheral devices
into its mainframe computers reached the courts, albeit sometimes under
the rubric of monopolization. In a leading case from that period, Califor-
nia Computer Products, Inc. v. IBM Corp.,246 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that even a monopolist has "the right to
redesign its products to make them more attractive to buyers-whether by
reason of lower manufacturing cost and price or improved perform-
ance."24 7 Subsequently, in Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp.,248 the Ninth Cir-
cuit relied upon its earlier decision in California Computer Products when it
affirmed a district court determination that a "head/disk assembly" was a
component part in a disk drive and thus did not constitute a separate
product for tying purposes. 2 49 In effect, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
rationale which it had adopted to evaluate product integration for monop-
olization purposes applied as well to issues of technological tying.2 50 That
court's subsequent decision in Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co.2 51 employed analogous reasoning-after ruling that Kodak had not
been engaged in unlawful technological tying, the court ruled that the
substance of the unsuccessful tying claim could not be used to support a
monopolization claim. 252
The tying issue was addressed last June by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in the contempt proceeding. 253 Fol-
lowing an analysis in the Areeda antitrust treatise, 254 the court ruled that
246. 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
247. Id. at 744.
248. 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
249. See id. ("We are unable to distinguish Memorex's case from the California
Computer Products case, and we conclude that, on the authority of that case the
judgment should be affirmed.").
250. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228, 233
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (explaining requirements for illegal tying arrangement). Gener-
ally, the courts have rejected claims of technological tying and/or monopolization
where a product integration appears to offer improved convenience or value. See,
e.g., California Computer Products, 613 F.2d at 744 (discussing benefits of product
integration); Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307,
1330 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting that beneficial technological result may warrant ty-
ing); Innovation Data Processing, Inc. v. IBM, Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1470, 1476
(D.N.J. 1984) (finding arrangement in question to be "lawful package of techno-
logically integrated components"). Courts have also rejected technological tying
and associated monopolization claims in contexts in which a newly developed tech-
nology required several new products to be used in conjunction with each other.
See Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 542-43 (9th Cir.
1983) ("We do not believe that, standing alone, such technological interrelation-
ship among complementary products is sufficient to establish the coercion essen-
tial to a per se unlawful tying arrangement.").
251. 703 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1983).
252. See id. at 543-45.
253. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
254. 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 1746b (1996).
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an "integrated product" is "a product that combines functionalities (which
may also be marketed separately and operated together) in a way that of-
fers advantages unavailable if the functionalities are bought separately and
combined by the purchaser." 255 As the court saw it, the Explorer and the
Windows operating system shared such substantial amounts of overlapping
code that they met one part of this test.256 It was Microsoft, the manufac-
turer, which wrote the code that was used both in the browser and in the
operating system. 25 7 Neither the end-user nor the computer manufac-
turer that installed these systems on the computers could combine these
separate functionalities. 258 They were combined at the manufacturing
stage in the code design. 259 As to the issue of whether the combination
offered advantages to purchasers, the court ruled that in interpreting the
consent decree "the question is not whether the integration is a net plus
but merely whether there is a plausible claim that it brings some advan-
tage."260 Although the court left open the question as to whether the lat-
ter standard is appropriate for antitrust law generally, the court relied
heavily on antitrust authorities and indicated throughout its opinion its
belief that courts lack institutional competence to review design deci-
sions.26 1 Moreover, the court took pains to point out that its analysis was
consistent with antitrust tying law. 262 The logic of the court's approach
suggests that for antitrust law generally, courts should adopt a deferential
rationality standard, accepting the manufacturer's design decisions so
long as those decisions plausibly provide advantages to customers. 26 3 The
basic approach set forth in this opinion will probably guide the disposition
of the tying issues in the new antitrust case. The district court, despite its
own "misgivings," has acknowledged that the court of appeals decision of
last June provides support to the Microsoft defense. 264
The analytical framework set forth by the court of appeals is an attrac-
tive one because it avoids the problems of courts second-guessing manu-
facturers on product design. Yet that framework does not provide a basis
for addressing the issue of most concern to the Government-that of the
255. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d at 948.
256. See id. at 949.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id. (discussing code combination offered by manufacturer).
260. Id. at 950.
261. See id. at 948-51.
262. See id. at 950 (discussing precedent and concluding that its own analysis
is "consistent with tying law").
263. See id. at 948 ("Antitrust scholars have long recognized the undesirability
of having courts oversee product design, and any dampening of technological in-
novation would be at cross-purposes with antitrust law.").
264. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1998-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,261,
at 82,672-82,677 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting that United States Court of Appeals for
District of Columbia Circuit adopted "technological tying" standard proposed by
Microsoft).
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relation between the Java programming language and the Microsoft mo-
nopoly over operating systems. Suppose that we can avoid the difficult
doctrinal problems presented by the tying, monopolization and attempted
monopolization case law, so that we can face the policy issue directly.
When a business firm holding an upstream monopoly wants to integrate
its operations downstream, should it be required to follow a two-track sce-
nario by offering the public-along with its integrated product-the op-
tion of an unintegrated upstream product as well? That is essentially what
the Government is demanding and the district court is inclined to
grant.265 The benefits of such an approach would, of course, be that the
public would have the option of accepting or rejecting the integration.
The downside is that once that option were imposed, the producer would
be under continuing governmental and judicial pressure to ensure that
the upstream product remained compatible with rival downstream
products.
In context, this would mean that Microsoft would be permitted to
integrate the Explorer into its operating system only if it also makes an
unintegrated version of the operating system available. An operating sys-
tem in which the Explorer can be deactivated and replaced with an in-
dependent browser appears to be acceptable to the Government. This
scenario, however, seems to assume that the operating system and the in-
dependent browsers will be fully compatible. Would this scenario require
those aspects of the operating system that interact with browsers to be fro-
zen at their current stage of development? Would Microsoft, under such a
scenario, be required to coordinate its operating system development with
Netscape to ensure that changes in its operating system remained compati-
ble with the Netscape browser and that changes in the Netscape browser
interfaced properly with the operating system? Neither the Government
nor the district court have addressed these aspects of this two-track
scenario.
These are intriguing and difficult issues. They force us to face funda-
mental values. We want the courts to guarantee market freedom, yet we
do not want business decisions-including those involving product de-
sign-to be made by the courts. We face here, on the one hand, the limits
of judicial competence and, on the other hand, a determination of what
market freedom means. It is possible, however, that the present litigation
does not require these issues to be resolved now. If, as appears likely, the
underlying Government concern is the possibility that Microsoft will use
its Windows monopoly to prevent the emergence of the Java paradigm,
then that concern may be put to rest without impinging upon the integra-
tion of the Explorer into the Windows operating system. The remainder
of this Article argues that the temporal leveraging analysis underlying
265. See id. at 82,674 ("The market can make that determination only if two
bundled products are also offered in their unbundled form, as they were in the
IBM cases.").
1999]
43
Gifford: Java and Microsoft: How Does the Antitrust Story Unfold
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
much of the Government's two antitrust proceedings is flawed. It is flawed
because it relies upon a network-effects scenario that the Government may
not have fully analyzed.
B. Innovation and Incompatible Systems
Although the Government's contempt charges against Microsoft can
be evaluated under traditional tying doctrine, it would unjustly depreciate
the Government's case to take that approach. Classic tying doctrine is
heavily grounded upon an archaic view of economics. In neither the con-
tempt proceeding nor the subsequent antitrust case can the Government
be accused of relying on outdated economic analysis or an excessively doc-
trinal approach towards antitrust law. Rather, the Government is relying
upon new theories of economics dealing with network externalities and a
new vision of the computer industry predicated upon the success of the
Java platform paradigm. It is this vision and these new analytical tools that
are critical to the Government's strategy.
In seeking to prevent Microsoft from tying the browser to its operat-
ing system, the Government seeks to expand the opportunities for the Java
paradigm to evolve. Currently, several of the market's major actors are
advancing this paradigm, relying on Java as a competitive weapon against
Microsoft. Thus Sun Microsystems has developed, and is promoting Java,
not for revenues that Java licenses can generate for it directly, but as a
means for projecting its image as a leader in the computer industry, and
perhaps as a means for staving off the replacement of its low-end work
stations running on Sun's Solaris, its UNIX-based operating system, with
cheaper personal computers running on Intel microprocessors and Win-
dows NT. 2 6 6 Also, Netscape has committed itself to Java, hoping that
through Java, its browser will become the user interface of the future, re-
placing the Windows interface now controlled by Microsoft. 267 Indeed,
Netscape has developed technology to cast a shell over the Windows inter-
face so that users will employ the Netscape browser as the control panel
not only for interacting with the internet, but for interacting with pro-
grams on their hard disks as well.2 68 The Government, however, remains
concerned that despite its backing by Sun Microsystems, Netscape, IBM
266. See Steve Hamm & Robert D. Hof, Operation Sunblock: Microsoft Goes to
War, Bus. WK., Oct. 27, 1997, at 110, 110, 112 (discussing possibility of Microsoft
assault on Sun workstation market); David Kirkpatrick, Meanwhile, Back at Head-
quarters.... FORTUNE, Oct. 13, 1997, at 82, 82-84 (describing possible threat to Sun
Unix-based servers from Windows NT).
267. See Halfhill, TODAY the WEB, supra note 49, at 68 (asserting that Java
could surpass Windows as software platform by end of century).
268. See David Bank, Microsoft Moves to Control the PC Screen, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5,
1996, at B2 (discussing Netscape's shell technology, known as Constellation, for
use on top of Windows). For a discussion of Netscape's apparent failure to follow
up on its Constellation technology, see Mark Schlack, ByrE, July 1998, at 12
("Where is the web top that Netscape teased us with when it launched the Constel-
lation beta a year ago?").
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and others, the Java paradigm may well be the superior technology that is
defeated by the network effects of Microsoft products. 269 Because of this
concern, the Government is aggressively attempting to ensure that
Microsoft does not leverage its advantage in operating systems into domi-
nance of internet technology.
The rivalry and conflict between Netscape, Sun, IBM and others with
Microsoft, as well as the antitrust proceeding brought by the Government,
are connected in one way or another with issues of software compatibility
and/or interoperability. Many, but not all, of these conflicts are con-
nected to the vision of the Java platform paradigm. Despite their superfi-
cial similarities, these actual conflicts, as well as other potential conflicts,
raise different competitive issues and, therefore, need to be separately
identified and evaluated. This is the subject of the next section.
V. How INNOVATION AND INCOMPATIBILITY RELATE TO THE JAVA
PLATFORM PARADIGM
The vision of the Java platform paradigm is attractive because it allows
all software applications and operating systems to interact.2 70 Indeed, this
vision of a future universal compatibility-a compatibility dependent
upon Java's interoperability feature-appears to be a major advance over
the present internet system. The present system lacks interoperability be-
tween platforms, but is nonetheless a world in which universal accessibility
to internet sites can be actively pursued as an ideal and approached in
practice. Microsoft and Netscape actively compete in the browser and
server markets, but consumers expect the browsers of both companies to
provide them with access to virtually ail internet sites. As the discussion
below indicates, although universal access is not invariably achieved, it re-
mains nonetheless an ideal in the minds of consumers. As a result, both
companies are constrained by this ideal.
Both the ideal of present universal accessibility and the vision of a
future in which all software can interact appear to be threatened when
either of these major companies (1) markets browsers that are incompati-
ble with widely employed server software, (2) markets server software that
is incompatible with the browser provided by the other company or (3)
markets either browsers or servers that employ nonstandard versions of
Java.
269. See Complaint, supra note 1, 68, 127 (relating allegations of tying to
Java and network effects).
270. See Lemley & McGowan, Competitive Propriety, supra note 12, at 733-34
(finding platform innovative because it may represent development of operating
system allowing users to access other software applications in addition to
Windows).
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A. Two Kinds of Incompatibility
Underlying concerns about software incompatibility on the internet
are two significantly different kinds of incompatibility. Both kinds of in-
compatibility involve the products of Netscape and Microsoft in the
server/browser market. These two kinds of incompatibility have very dif-
ferent ramifications for the software industry and the consumers of its
products. The first broad kind of software incompatibility grows out of the
intense rivalry between Netscape and Microsoft and tends to be temporary
in nature. Being temporary in nature, it carries no threat to the long-term
universality of internet standards. The second kind of software incompati-
bility is of a deeper, structural kind that is more likely to last. It carries
ramifications for the direction in which internet standards develop. Struc-
tural incompatibility directly implicates the future of the Java platform par-
adigm. The societal ramifications of the rivalry engendering these
different types of incompatibilities are addressed below.
1. Innovation and the Process of Standardization in a Context of No-Holds
Barred Competition
Microsoft and Netscape vigorously compete for the servers and brows-
ers markets. 27 1 The result of this competition is a constant stream of mu-
tually incompatible innovations in server/browser technology.2 72
A lucrative sector of the server/browser market is the intranet, the
private networks established by business firms and groups of corporate af-
filiates for internal communication. 273 The prevailing understanding of
the industry is that a seller's server/browser packages become increasingly
attractive to intranet buyers as its share of the installed base of browsers
increases. 274 This belief helps explain the willingness of Microsoft and
271. See Angela Hickman, E-Commerce: The Missing Link, PC MAC., Apr. 7,
1998, at 29 (noting that Microsoft and Netscape are main contenders in web server
market); Steve Lohr, "Browser War" Limits Access to Web Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1997, at DI (acknowledging market share and innovation war between Microsoft
and Netscape).
272. See Lohr, supra note 271, at D1 (discussing inability to access entire web
because of incompatibility of Netscape and Microsoft technology).
273. See Ian C. Ballon, Intellectual Property Protection and Related Third Party Lia-
bility, 482 PLI/PAT 559, 645 (1997) (defining intranet as "an employer's computer
network"). According to Netscape Chief Executive James L. Barksdale, the
browser war is the means to a more lucrative end-the sale of server software for
corporate intranets. See Robert D. Hof et al., Cyberspace Showdown, Bus. WK., Oct. 7,
1996, at 34, 34 (reporting that Netscape is competing actively for corporate in-
tranet software business); Laurence Zuckerman, Browser Moves by Microsoft Make
Even Netscape Blink, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1996, at D1 (describing battle over server
software used by corporate clients for internal Web-like networks called intranets).
274. See Green, supra note 113, at 69 (stating that Netscape "pioneered the
internet business model" of giving away software to build up market share).
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Netscape to give away their browsers.2 75 Their desire to foster sales to the
intranet market also helps explain their intense rivalry in innovative activ-
ity.27 6 Competition for intranet sales drives each company to devise a con-
tinuous series of improvements for its products, each trying to outperform
the other.
The result of this continuous stream of improvements and added ca-
pabilities from each company is that the latest developments by Microsoft
will not be compatible with the latest versions of Netscape and vice versa.
The incompatibility results because each company tries to get a lead on
the other. The principal technological divergences resulting from the ri-
valry between Netscape and Microsoft take the form of differing standards
governing Java, differing enhancements to HTML and similar matters
whose evolution is ultimately guided by a standards body. This incompati-
bility at the cutting edges of innovation does not pose a problem in much
of the intranet market where the users-particular companies or corpo-
rate networks-purchase browser/server software for their entire
operation.
Carried over the internet, however, this intense rivalry in innovation
means that the most recent innovations in server/browser software are not
likely to be compatible with major parts of the installed base of existing
browsers.2 77 Of course, it is possible for users, at nominal or no cost, to
obtain the latest versions of both of the principal browsers. 278 By doing
so, a user could receive communications from any server, even if that
server employed the technology incorporated in the latest releases of Net-
scape or Microsoft.279 Most browser users, however, do not take the
trouble to maintain two browsers in their most recently revised form. 280
Because server site operators recognize the incompatibility of much of the
installed bases of browsers with the most recent releases of either Netscape
or Microsoft, they do not use those most recent releases on internet server
275. See id. (describing computer companies' incentive for providing free
browsers to computer manufacturers as means of increasing number of its own
browsers on market).
276. See Hof et al., supra note 273, at 34 (discussing Netscape's plan to use
new technology to rival Windows).
277. See Lohr, supra note 271, at D1 (stating that internet web developers
must often design software to fit either Netscape's Navigator or Microsoft's Ex-
plorer to employ latest server/browser innovations). Although there are a few
server sites that remain completely inaccessible to one kind of browser, a more
common problem is for a portion of a server site to malfunction with a particular
browser. See id. (explaining that recent browser innovations typically produce de-
nial of accessibility to portions of server sites as opposed to total exclusion). Most
sites, however, are fully accessible to all browsers. See id.
278. See Green, supra note 113, at 69 (noting that Microsoft and Netscape
have made browsers available for downloading cost free).
279. See Lohr, supra note 271, at DI (observing that users could install both
browsers as vehicles for accessing entire web).
280. See id. at D13 (describing disadvantages of installing duplicative brows-
ers). Loading two browsers, inter alia, consumes space on a PC's hard drive. See id.
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sites. As a result, the implementation of innovative technology is often
postponed for a year or more, until Netscape and Microsoft work out their
technological differences. 28 1 Nonetheless, both companies appear to rec-
ognize the need to maintain universal access to the internet. Therefore,
these incompatibility problems tend to be temporary ones, resulting from
competitive pressure to innovate, pushing one or both companies techno-
logically ahead of existing protocols.28 2 Ultimately, the protocols are
modified and both companies do what is necessary to bring their modifi-
cations into compliance, thus preserving universal access. 28 3
The market generates both parts of this scenario-it fosters the rivalry
in innovation that generates the temporary incompatibilities and it pres-
sures the two companies to resolve these incompatibilities in cooperation
with the relevant standards organizations. As long as each company ac-
counts for a major part of the installed base of browsers, neither company
can ignore the problem of compatibility. Browsers that were compatible
with only a portion of server sites would be problematic in the eyes of
consumers, as would server software that was incompatible with a major
portion of the browsers currently in use.
The model describing innovation in server/browser software is a dy-
namic one in which each company seeks to achieve an edge over the other
by providing either a more convenient or technologically superior prod-
uct. As one company obtains an edge, it exploits that edge in sales of
server/browser software in the intranet market where the homogeneity of
networks can be assured. Most internet server sites do not employ the
most recent innovations in server/browser technology despite their availa-
bility to those sites and their programmers. The result is a steady stream of
innovations for the intranet market that, although not immediately usable
for the internet, ultimately become fully usable in that market as well.
An alternative and more orderly model exists in which changes in
official standards precede the implementation of new technology. This
model resembles the one propounded by Sun for Java-a core model of
full interoperability through a Java-based and Sun-supervised set of stan-
dards. Even this model recognizes a penumbral area in which Java practi-
tioners do not always achieve the full interoperability that they desire.
That penumbral category is probably a practical necessity, as companies
developing Java capabilities will almost invariably do so ahead of the next
281. See id. ("Web developers delay adding cutting-edge technology to their
sites until Microsoft and Netscape agree to make their browser technology compat-
ible ....").
282. See id. (discussing how competitive pressures may prompt companies to
correct incompatibility problems). At the recent Senate Hearings, both Microsoft
CEO Bill Gates and Netscape CEOJim Barksdale asserted their intention to recon-
cile their newly developed technology with internet standards set by bodies such as
W3C. See generally Senate Hearing, supra note 10 (discussing efforts by computer
companies to create compatible browsers).
283. See Lohr, supra note 271, at D13 (discussing fact that cooperation by
computer companies ultimately will realize universal internet access).
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set of standards. The flexibility of this model at the edges facilitates devel-
opment. Development is further fostered by the ability of Sun's Java licen-
sees to acquire intellectual property rights to their improvements, even if
those rights would be subordinate to Sun's rights in the underlying Java
technology.28 4 The preservation of the intellectual property rights in im-
provements helps to stimulate innovations; however, the need to submit
improvements to Sun for approval may delay or otherwise impede the im-
plementation of new server/browser improvements, thereby detracting
from the incentive to innovate. 28 5
The current litigation between Sun and Microsoft over the lawfulness
of the latter's modifications ofJava illustrates the potential for conflict be-
tween one company's interest in maintaining a standard format and an-
other company's interest in bringing its technological innovations to
market. At base, however, a model that emphasizes the approval of tech-
nological changes either in advance or at the earliest possible date and a
model in which the official standards evolve to incorporate previously im-
plemented technological changes may, in the long run, produce similar
results. In both models, these advances are, at some time, reconciled with
industry standards.
One should expect that when Microsoft implements its latest techno-
logical advance in an effort to gain an edge on Netscape, the latter will
complain that Microsoft is attempting to undermine universal access to
the web. As servers and browsers incorporate new technologies, preexist-
ing browsers will be unable to access material embodied in the new
form. 2 8 6 Accordingly, internet servers that make immediate use of new
technology will be inaccessible in whole or in part to the older brows-
ers.2 8 7 To that extent, universal access will indeed be impaired.288 This,
however, is the way technology advances in a no-holds barred competitive
setting like today's browser wars. In any event, the incompatibility will
likely remain a temporary phenomenon that will disappear as protocols
are modified and as new browser/server releases by both companies even-
tually overcome the incompatibilities generated by each step in the contin-
uing technological advance.
284. See Technology License and Distribution Agreement Between Sun Microsystems,
Inc. and Microsoft Corporation § 2.10(b) (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://
java.sun.com/lawsuit/document.html> (agreeing that "Licensee retains all [intel-
lectual property] rights, title and interest in and to"Java derivative or independent
work).
285. The longer is the period of evaluation preceding use of the improve-
ment, the more is the incentive to improve dampened.
286. See Lohr, supra note 271, at DI (finding "[b]rownout troubles are partly
an ironic byproduct of innovation").
287. See id. (explaining that as Microsoft and Netscape take divergent devel-
opmental pathways, they must tailor their software to make use of new
innovations).
288. See id. (finding that older browsers are inaccessible to gamut of
innovations).
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There is, however, another route that innovation may take, a route
that generates technology whose incompatibilities are not temporary.
Either Microsoft or Netscape may opt for technology that is permanently
incompatible with that of the other. Microsoft's J/Direct programming
and its ActiveX software interface technology, for example, work only with
Windows systems.289 Servers using these tools, therefore, would not be
able to communicate with non-Windows systems. The roots of these in-
compatibilities lie deep in their structures and, as a result, are permanent.
Innovations of this type are discussed below.
2. Innovation Implicating the Java-Platform Paradigm
Because standard Java must go through a process of conversion from
Java byte code into machine code, Java runs slower than programs written
to operate directly on the user's platform.2 90 One way of speeding up the
operation of programs written in Java is to write to interface directly with
the platform.'s APIs, avoiding the conversion process. 29 1 Java program-
mers have always had the option of invoking native code, but that option
sacrifices Java's interoperability feature.29 2 Sun's Java Development Kit
1.1 had native method invocations (NMIs) and its Java Development Kit
1.2 provides an improved native invocation called a Java Native Interface
(JNI) .293
Microsoft has attacked the problem by providing its own tools to en-
able Java programmers to invoke the APIs of the Windows system. 294
Microsoft's J/Direct provides a Windows-specific interface. 295 Microsoft's
new Visual J++ supports J/Direct and a library of Java classes called Win-
289. SeeJesse Berst, Forecasting the Browser Battle, WINDOWS SOURCES, Oct. 1997,
at 47, 47 (discussing allegations that Microsoft uses J/Direct, which only functions
with Windows because Microsoft wants to perpetuate software incompatibility);
Martin Heller, Java Explodes, WINDOWS MAG., Aug. 1998, at 251, 251-52 (discussing
J/Direct's Windows-only use); TECHNIQUES: Programming for the Internet, EXE,
May 1, 1998, at 33, 33 (stating that ActiveX only functions with Windows and will
only allow internet access if Microsoft's Explorer is used).
290. See Elliot, supra note 137, at 66 (reporting thatJVM interpretation slows
Java); Halfhiil & Gallant, supra note 60, at 62-63 (noting that there are several
factors that slowJava's performance, including dynamic binding and object hierar-
chies, hardware abstraction, interpreters that translate byte code instructions into
native CPU instructions, automatically checking for array-bounds exceptions, mul-
tithreading, dynamic loading and restrictive security measures).
291. See Halfhill & Gallant, supra note 60, at 68 (stating that J/Direct offers
"higher performance and richer functionality").
292. See id. (noting that "Java has always allowed" for invocation of native
code).
293. See id. (stating that Java will introduce new version of its Java Develop-
ment Kit (JDK) that will "introduce a better [native method invocation] called the
Java native interface (JNI)").
294. See id. (noting Microsoft's offering of products for invoking APIs of Win-
dows system).
295. See id. ("Microsoft's visual J++ supports a Windows-specific interface
called J/Direct.").
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dows Foundation Classes. 296 The latter enables a programmer to wrap
major parts of Windows APIs in Java code, thereby facilitating the connec-
tion between the program and the Windows system. 29 7 Microsoft's devel-
opment of these variations on Java has engendered a conflict with Sun,
because Sun sees this technology as a threat to the integrity of Java.298
That threat does not appear to arise from the invocation of native code
and the sacrifice of interoperability, however, because Java has long coun-
tenanced that option.299 Rather, the threat seen by Sun appears to lie in
the implementation of technology that Sun has not approved. J/Direct
and Windows Foundation Classes operate significantly faster than stan-
dard Java.300 They thus appear to meet a significant need. If, and to the
extent that, they also operate faster than alternative methods for invoking
native code, they may pose a threat to the Sun-approved version of Java.
Microsoft has also developed a set of software-to-software interfaces
known as ActiveX. 30 1 ActiveX will perform many of the feats ofJava, such
as facilitating the production of small programs for activation on client
machines (like the Java applets),302 ActiveX, however, lacks standard
Java's interoperability characteristic.3 0 3 Both the J/Direct technology and
ActiveX outperform standard Java in speed. 30 4 Microsoft's Internet Ex-
plorer 4.0 supports both J/Direct and ActiveX. 30 5
296. See id. (describing Microsoft's Windows Foundation Classes (WFC),
which lets one access library of Java classes).
297. See id. (stating that WFC "wrap [s] major parts of the Windows API in Java
code that handles native method calls automatically").
298. See id. (noting that critics say Microsoft's strategies may threaten Java's
integrity).
299. See id. (stating that Java has always allowed invocation of native code).
300. See id. (stating that "Microsoft's informal tests" show that "a WFC window
with 23 miscellaneous components opens and closes about 600 times faster than an
identical AWT window").
301. For a further discussion of the development of ActiveX, see supra notes
145-50 and accompanying text.
302. See Robert D. Hof, Java's Cup Runneth Over, Bus. WK., May 20, 1996, at
103 [hereinafter Hof, Java's Cup] (describing ActiveX creation of applets); Savage,
supra note 147, at 80 ("ActiveX allows ... programmers to easily include network
functionality in existing programs.").
303. See Savage, supra note 147, at 82 (describing fact that Java, unlike Ac-
tiveX, operates on practically all types of operating systems).
304. See David S. Linthicum, Java and ActiveX, BY=E, Sept. 1997, at 61, 61
[hereinafter Linthicum, Java] (explaining that Windows's use of native features,
such asJ/Direct's machine code, causes ActiveX to operate much faster than Java).
305. See David S. Linthicum, Detailing and Debating ActiveX, COMPUTER SHOP-
PER, Oct. 1997, at 634, 634 [hereinafter Linthicum, ActiveX] (discussing fact that
ActiveX only functions when using Internet Explorer). Microsoft announced at
mid-Summer 1997 that, starting in July, J/Direct capability would augment its vir-
tual machine for Java. See Sharon Gaudin, Microsoft Tries to Reel in Java Jumpers
Redmond to C++ Developers: Write Java, But for Windows, COMPUTERWORLD, July 7,
1997, at 20, 20 [hereinafter Gaudin, Write Java] (announcing Microsoft's plans to
incorporate J/Direct). Programmers would have the option of employing stan-
dardJava with full interoperability orJ/Direct that would tie Java-built applications
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Thus, for the operation of Windows-only networks, J/Direct and Ac-
tiveX may be superior to standard Java because they possess an advantage
in speed and possibly in reliability.30 6 Although they lackJava's interoper-
ability, interoperability is not relevant to a homogeneous network such as
a Windows-only system where all users employ the same platform. Such
Windows-only networks might be found among the intranets of particular
business firms.30 7 A number of intranets have opted for one or both of
these technologies.30 8
Java's promise of interoperability can be threatened when program-
mers for internet servers weigh Java's advantage in interoperabability
against its disadvantage in speed. If a programmer considers speed and/
or reliability in interfacing with the Windows segment of the market more
desirable than reaching all segments of the market, that programmer will
likely prefer a method of interfacing directly with the Windows APIs. In
such a case, the use of ActiveX technology or the J/Direct interface would
be attractive options. If significant numbers of programmers begin to
make the same judgments, the use of ActiveX or J/Direct would increase.
As more programmers opt for ActiveX or J/Direct, Windows users would
increasingly adopt the Explorer as their browser of choice. As the choice
of ActiveX or J/Direct server programming grew, the incentives for non-
Windows users to switch to a Windows platform would also increase.
This scenario bears the marks of network effects and path depen-
dency theory. Yet, in this case especially, prudence cautions against draw-
ing hasty conclusions. Proponents of network effects theory have stressed
that network effects can result in the dominance of inferior technology,
merely because the dominant technology jumped into an early lead as a
result of some accident or other trivial event.3 0 9 As a result, rival-and
superior-technologies were never able to catch up.3 10 In other words,
the technical superiorities of the rival technologies never sufficiently offset
the network values appropriated by the technically inferior leader. Even
directly to the Windows platform. See id. at 20 (describing benefits of Microsoft's
plan to incorporate J/Direct functions into its Java platform).
306. See Linthicum, ActiveX, supra note 305, at 634 ("[Java's] portability comes
at the price of performance, since Java requires an interpreter between the code
and the underlying operating system. ActiveX, by contrast, is really a Windows-
only solution, but ActiveX controls offer native appearance and performance.").
307. See Preston Gralla, Applets, WINDOWS SOURCES, Mar. 1997, at 161, 161 (re-
porting that many intranet developers write applications for Windows-only
network).
308. See id. (noting that some intranets have both forms of technologies).
309. See ARTHUR, supra note 168, at 24 (stating that "in practice, an early-start
technology may already be locked in, so that a new arrival, although potentially
superior, cannot gain a footing"); Arthur, supra note 152, at 116 (finding that
"[w]hen two or more ... increasing-return technologies 'compete' . . . for ... a
'market' of potential adopters, insignificant events may by chance give one of them
an initial advantage in adoptions").
310. See Arthur, supra note 152, at 116 (warning that allowing particular tech-
nology to "corner[ ] the market" may exclude other potentially better technology).
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the most enthusiastic proponents of network effects, however, readily ad-
mit the possibility that the leader in a positive feedback market could pos-
sess technical superiority. 311 Indeed, the leader in such a market does not
inevitably attain its leadership as a result of a trivial event; the leader might
have attained that leadership precisely because of the technical superiority
of its product.3 12 The contribution of network effects theory merely shows
that the leader could be, but is not necessarily, technically inferior.3 13
Network effects theory helps us to focus on the gap-if any-between
technical superiority and the value of network affiliation, and thus on the
challenge that later entrants must overcome in challenging the dominant
firm in a market exhibiting network effects. 31
4
In the above scenario, programmers begin to write in J/Direct or Ac-
tiveX because they prefer the speed and reliability associated with those
tools over the universal accessibility of the present internet structure, in-
cluding the present and emerging Java tools associated with that network.
This is not a scenario of technical inferiority winning out over superior
technology because of the value associated with belonging to a network.
Rather, in this scenario, programmers opt for technical superiority (speed
and reliability) over belonging to a network, i.e., the present almost univer-
sally accessible internet network (including its Java tools).
As more programmers opt for ActiveX or J/Direct (rather than stan-
dard Java), the browser(s) that carry ActiveX and J/Direct capability in-
crease in attractiveness to users because the server program base using
these tools has increased.3 1 5 Thus, there is a network effect-the server
side of the network employing these tools has grown, resulting in the in-
creased attractiveness of browsers carrying compatible technology.3 16 As
this increased attractiveness of technologically compatible browsers results
in the use of more such browsers, the incentive for server programmers to
employ ActiveX and J/Direct increases. There are network effects at work
here, but the network effects are working in a significantly different way
from the classic network effects scenario.3 17
311. See id. (acknowledging possible adoption of more advanced technology).
312. See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 152, at 108 ("[T]he
market may be biased in favor of a new, superior, but incompatible technology
313. See id. (noting real possibility that, despite incompatibility problems,
more valuable technology will be most widely adopted).
314. See Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, supra note 33, at 641 ("[N]etwork effects
reinforce the advantage secured by the market leader from its declining average
cost of production. The producer who is ahead of its rivals . . . has advantages
which are increasingly difficult for its rivals to overcome.").
315. See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 152, at 133 (explaining how "utility"
of product may increase as others also use such product).
316. See id. (finding that utility of product depends upon use of product).
317. For a further discussion of the classic network effects scenario, see supra
notes 152-65 and accompanying text.
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The Netscape Communicator, the Microsoft Internet Explorer 4.0
and the Sun Microsystems HotJava contain Java virtual machines, enabling
them to receive and transmit to users standard Java programming. 318 As
noted earlier, the Explorer's virtual machine uses a Java just-in-time com-
piler that speeds up the transformation of Java byte code into machine
code. The Explorer's Java JIT compiler, together with the Java virtual ma-
chines of the Netscape and Sun browsers, critically affects the analysis of
the network effects of ActiveX and J/Direct.3 19 Server programmers need
not choose between a superior technology with a small base and an infer-
ior technology with a large base. If Java is the superior technology, server
programmers will employ it, thereby serving the entire universe of Win-
dows, many of which use the Explorer and its JavaJIT compiler, plus Mac-
intosh, OS2, Linux and UNIX platforms. 320 If ActiveX or J/Direct are
superior technologies, server programmers will weigh the advantages of
the superior technology against the smaller installed base capable of han-
dling it. In this case, if the programmers decide to employ ActiveX or J/
Direct, they will be opting for superior technology over the value of adher-
ing to the larger network.
Because programmers are not forced to choose between the universal
Java network on one hand and the technology of ActiveX andJ/Direct on
the other, their choice to employ either of the latter two technologies
shows that, in their view, the superior quality of these technologies out-
weighs the advantages of participating in the universal network. Network
effects influence their choice as increasing numbers of servers employ Ac-
tiveX or J/Direct for technical reasons, and more users find the Explorer
attractive as a result. Thus, the disadvantages of connecting to a small
network are reduced, making the decision to use the superior technology
easier. But at no point in this scenario are the programmers' decisions to
opt for ActiveX or J/Direct pressured by network effects to substitute an
inferior technology for a superior technology.
There is one caveat to this analysis. Although programers presently
use Java, it has not yet attained its full potential. Currently, Java provides
small programs (applets) to internet users. The large software programs
that can potentially be written in Java are only now beginning to be writ-
ten. The Java platform paradigm, in which a Java-based browser replaces
Windows as the user interface, has not yet arrived. A server programmer
who today chooses J/Direct or ActiveX on the basis of speed and/or relia-
bility over universal access is making that choice before Java has flowered
318. See Dragan & Seltzer, supra note 51, at 101 ("Web browsers such as
Microsoft Internet Explorer, Netscape Navigator, and Sun's own HotJava have Java
[virtual machines] built-in.").
319. For a further discussion ofJavaJIT compilers, see supra notes 141-43 and
accompanying text.
320. See Gaudin, Write Java, supra note 305, at 20 ("The move to Java language
is going to occur. [Microsoft] will support interoperability between Java and Win-
dows .... They don't want developers to have to make a choice .... ").
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into its full potential. That choice reflects the programmer's weighing of
the present advantages and disadvantages of J/Direct and/or ActiveX
against the Java of today, not against the value of Java as it might be aug-
mented by the technical improvements of tomorrow.
So long as all browsers maintain Java capability, the choice of pro-
grammers today to use Windows-only technology (such as J/Direct or Ac-
tiveX) does not foreclose a later move to Java when the problematic
technical characteristics of Java (speed and reliability) are improved. In-
deed, the Java capability of the three major browsers preserves Java's pres-
ent potential and preserves the potentiality of Java to replace Windows-
only technology at any time in the future when the relative technical ad-
vantages of the Java technology make such a move desirable.
Should Microsoft change the characteristics of the Explorer at some
future time so that it could no longer handle standard Java, an entirely
new situation would result. In that event, programmers would be forced
to choose between the advantages of reaching the Explorer's installed
base and the remainder of users (whose browsers would receive Java and
other programming). Such a change in the Explorer's capabilities, how-
ever, would be economically irrational until the Explorer achieved domi-
nance. Unless and until the Explorer achieved browser dominance, server
programmers would write for the largest network-assuming, of course,
that the technical advantages of Windows-only technology were insuffi-
cient to overcome the values of that network.3 21 By hypothesis, the largest
network would be the Java network. To remain competitive with the Net-
scape Navigator, the Explorer would have to access the majority of server
sites.
Suppose, however, that the Explorer becomes the dominant browser.
What could then stop Microsoft from changing the Explorer's capabilities
to make it incompatible with standard Java? If Microsoft were to do this, it
would face several problems. First, the installed base of all browsers, in-
cluding Microsoft, Netscape and Sun browsers, is Java-compatible. All cur-
rent browsers are equipped with Java interpreters and the Explorer itself
has a JIT compiler. So long as most programmers were using Java,
Microsoft could not start releasing new browsers incompatible with stan-
dardJava. If it did so, most users would reject the new edition of Explorer.
Thus, to effectively change the Explorer's capabilities, Microsoft would
have to do so all at once. It would have to "upgrade" the existing base of
Explorers to a new version incompatible with Java. Could it do so? Proba-
bly not. Most Explorer users would probably decide not to upgrade. In-
deed, the core of computer users who are highly conscious of technical
321. This assumption is necessary to the scenario. If Windows-only technol-
ogy were sufficiently superior to offset the values of the Java network, then the
Explorer and Windows-only technology would replace the Java-based network. On
those facts, however, the movement from a Java-based network to a new Windows-
only network would not be the result of network effects, but of the triumph of a
superior technology.
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developments and active in internet communication would alert others to
the problematic nature of the "upgrade." In such circumstances, the mass
media would likely publicize the matter, thereby informing even the most
computer-illiterate users about the imminent threat to their access to in-
ternet material. In short, the scenario in which Microsoft flaunts its power
over programmers is implausible.
More plausibility attaches to a scenario in which Microsoft-whether
before or after it dominates the browser market-begins to make minor
shifts in the technology of its browsers, maintaining backward compatibil-
ity with standard Java and other existent technology, but introducing im-
proved capabilities on new browser editions. As a result, programmers
could include enhanced programming that only the Explorer could read.
They would not be required to include such programming because they
would be able to reach all users, including those using the newest Explorer
release, with standard Java and HTML. Should significant numbers of
programmers decide to include additional features that only the Explorer
could read, the attractiveness of the Explorer to users would increase. The
resulting expansion of the Explorer's installed base would, in turn, further
increase the attractiveness of the Explorer's unique technology to the pro-
grammers. But this scenario is one that we have already analyzed. The
network effects in this scenario are subordinate to the technical factors. If
the Explorer expands its share of the browser market as a result of the
technical shifts introduced into the browser, product superiority, not net-
work effects, would cause the expansion.
B. Antitrust, Innovation and the Java Platform Paradigm
It is possible that competition to sell browser/server software for use
in intranets is focusing innovation upon speed and reliability.3 22 The re-
sulting software thus may not be interoperable because speed and reliabil-
ity take precedence over interoperability in the intranet market.32 3
Should innovation, engendered by competition in the intranet market,
produce browser/server software that so excels in speed and reliability
that operators of internet servers opt for those qualities over interoper-
ability, then interoperability will not be achieved through the Java plat-
form. In that case, the possibility of a Java platform paradigm will have
been eclipsed by a Windows platform paradigm.
322. See Matthew Phair, Web Software Raises User Expectation, Presses Vendors, EN-
GINEERING NEws-RE.,June 30, 1997, at 12, 12 ("Driven by users who enjoy the ease
and speed of using browser software to access the latest information from any-
where in the world, vendors are being pressed to make their products Web-ena-
bled for project networks, websites, databases and intranets.").
323. See Linthicum, ActiveX, supra note 305, at 634 ("[Java's] portability comes
at the price of performance, since Java requires an interpreter between the code
and the underlying operating system. ActiveX, by contrast, is really a Windows-
only solution, but ActiveX controls offer native appearance and performance.").
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A further variation on innovation cannot be ignored. Microsoft could
concentrate its innovative efforts on improving the speed and reliability of
Windows-only technology, such as ActiveX and J/Direct, to defeat the
prospect of the Java platform paradigm replacing the Windows platform.
That kind of activity could be described as innovation designed to preserve
its Windows platform monopoly. But so long as the successes or failures of
those technologies are determined in the open market, the motivations
underlying innovative activity ought not to be a concern of the antitrust
laws.
The purpose of the antitrust laws is not to impose a particular plat-
form on the personal computer industry. Rather, it is to see that the mar-
ket determines what that paradigm is to be. In the event that the Windows
platform prevails, it will not be because network effects impose an inferior
technology on computer users. Instead, it will be because users prefer the
speed and reliability of the Windows-related software to the interoper-
ability feature of Java.
VI. CONCLUSION
The complex and perplexing antitrust issues raised explicitly or im-
plicitly in the Government/Microsoft and Sun/Microsoft litigation and in
the disputes and rivalries between Microsoft and Netscape confuse even
skilled antitrust lawyers. This Article has attempted to make a modest con-
tribution towards unraveling the confusion and identifying the factors that
underlie industry developments.
This Article is, of course, not the last word, not only because it ad-
dresses only some of the issues connected with the development of in-
ternet technology, but also because others will have additional analytical
contributions. This Article has attempted to show, however, that network
externalities, while an ever-present factor in the computer software indus-
try, is not always the critical factor determining the course of develop-
ment. Indeed, if innovations in server/browser technology from Microsoft
win widespread support in the internet marketplace, this may be an exam-
ple of a superior technology triumphing over network effects.
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